

JPRS-UMA-88-024
11 OCTOBER 1988



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-88-024

CONTENTS

11 OCTOBER 1988

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Military Commissions for Interethnic Relations Created [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 Sep 88]	1
KOMSOMOL Paper Criticizes KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Editorial Policy	
[R. Guseynov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 24 Sep 88]	2
Gareyev Interviewed on Effects of Glasnost	
[M. Gareyev; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 39, 24-30 Sep 88]	2
Yazov on Impact of New Thinking on Armed Forces [TASS, 21 Sep 88]	5
Openness Urged on Military Budget, Statistics	
[Y. Gontmakher; SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, 17 Sep 88]	5
19th Party Conference: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Readers Air Views on Conference Decisions	
[Readers' Letters; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Jul 88]	6

WARSAW PACT

'CPSU CC's Military Expert' on Disarmament in Europe	
[G. Batenin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 Aug 88]	9

ARMED FORCES

Call for Naval, Air Measures at Stockholm Talks [V. Tatarnikov; MOSCOW NEWS No 34, 21 Aug 88]	12
19th Party Conference: Officer Discusses Legal Reforms in Context of Military Regulations	
[A. Kovlikov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Jun 88]	12
General Gareyev Writes on 70th Anniversary of Armed Forces [M. Gareyev; OKTYABR No 2, Feb 88]	14

GROUND FORCES

Tank Troops Chief on Problems, Goals [A. Galkin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Sep 88]	23
--	----

NAVAL FORCES

New 'Kiev' Class Carrier Joins Fleet [V. Pasyakin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Jul 88]	25
Problems in Naval Combat Training [A. Khrapovich; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Jul 88]	25

DOSAAB

DOSAAB Status in Jewish Autonomous Oblast [B. Korsunskiy; SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, 10 Jul 88]	26
---	----

MILITARY HISTORY

History Journal View of Early Stage of WWII Criticized	
[I.A. Belov; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 13 Jun 88]	28

AFGHANISTAN

Domestic Reaction to Afghan Vets [G. Apresyan; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 3 Aug 88]	29
--	----

Military Commissions for Interethnic Relations Created

PM3009152588 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Sep 88 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Cultivate Internationalists"]

[Text] Army and navy service has long been a school of expertise, courage, and discipline. The resolution "On Interethnic Relations" approved at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference particularly highlights another facet of military service: It must also be a real school of internationalism. In this connection there must be a radical restructuring of the political, organizational, and ideological work performed by military cadres and party and Komsomol organizations in terms of the international education of personnel.

This work must focus on elucidating the essence of our Leninist national policy and the need to constantly strengthen the international unity of working people from all of the Soviet Union's nations and ethnic groups. It must also focus on shaping in Soviet servicemen patriotic and international conviction, a great sense of pride in our multiethnic motherland, and a readiness to defend it. This work must aim to further unite military collectives, enhance their professional activeness, and establish true friendship, fraternity, and comradeship among servicemen of different nationalities in the army and navy.

The experience of progressive subunits, units, and ships confirms that the international education of personnel in multiethnic collectives is very effective when it is organically linked with work to solve the tasks of combat readiness and with army and navy practice, and is enriched with new approaches and forms of influence. Here is an example: In the unit where Major A. Nemalkin is the political worker (Transbaykal Military District), they highlight two interconnected aspects in the organization of international education—specific political education work and concern for improving social conditions. They take account of the fact that men of more than 20 different nationalities serve in the unit. They are rationally distributed among the collectives. Everyone, irrespective of nationality or official position, is guaranteed the principle of an equal approach according to regulations. Duly considered Russian-language instruction is provided for servicemen with a poor knowledge of the language, which has great significance for their mastery of military matters and for acquainting them with spiritual and cultural values.

An important place in the army and navy today is given to eliciting and studying military servicemen's national interests, generalizing and spreading progressive experience in international education, and drawing up proposals and recommendations for commanding officers and political bodies to enhance the effectiveness of this work. To this end, commissions for interethnic relations are being set up under the Main Political Directorate of the

Soviet Army and Navy and the political directorates of the different branches of the Armed Forces, the military districts, and the groups of forces and fleets, while groups responsible for interethnic relations are being formed under the political bodies of formations and units and under party committees (bureaus).

When we talk about the need to update and improve the forms and methods of mass political, individual educational, party, and Komsomol work, this means that it must definitely take account of the multiethnic nature of subunits, units, and ships, military training establishments, institutions, and enterprises. Knowledge of the individual attitudes of military servicemen of different nationalities and the cultivation of great patriotic feeling in military collectives are becoming particularly important. There must be no place in the Army and Navy for cases of injustice and infringement of national dignity, national egoism, or arrogance arising on the basis of so-called regional cliques and entailing nonregulation relationships. Restructuring, democratization, and glasnost in the Army and Navy have brought these facts to light and at the same time created the necessary conditions to democratically overcome them.

Clearly, all this requires commanding officers, political bodies, party committees, and Komsomol committees to seek highly effective, largely new, and interesting forms of internationalist education which spiritually enrich people and draw them closer together. These include meetings with military servicemen of different nationalities in military councils, political bodies, party committees, and Komsomol committees, bringing new recruits from the union and autonomous republics, okrugs, and oblasts into contact with soldiers and sergeants of these nationalities, holding 10-day festivals of union and autonomous republics and celebrating the days of their formation, and regularly exchanging delegations between the working people of the republics, krays, and oblasts and the personnel of units, ships, and formations.

Success in work concerning international education primarily depends on the level of military cadres' political, ideological, and party maturity and professional competence. The political work they do to unite multiethnic subunits, units, and ships, and military VUZ's, establishments, and enterprises should be regarded as a school of international education for the leaders themselves. Officers, warrant officers, and ensigns must set an example of interethnic communication and show deep respect for the national feelings and traditions of the Soviet peoples.

One of the most important tasks is to cultivate in command and political cadres the expertise and ability to work in multiethnic military collectives. It is planned to include theoretical seminars in the training of commanding officers, while Marxist-Leninist instruction groups and political instruction for warrant officers and ensigns are to incorporate special talks and seminars on the problems of interethnic relations and the practice of international education.

Every commanding officer and political worker must study and have a good knowledge of the traditions and customs of the nations and ethnic groups whose emissaries serve in his unit, ship, or subunit. This knowledge must be put to active use in political education work with servicemen. Efforts by officers, warrant officers, and members of their families to learn the language spoken by the people in the union republic in whose territory their unit or subunit is stationed deserve every encouragement.

The work of military commissariats to select young people of the union republics' indigenous nationalities for military school training must be further improved. Stronger collaboration between military commissariats, military VUZ's, and local party and soviet bodies will help the successful solution of this problem. A thoroughly considered, substantiated system of studying CPSU national policy, up-to-date scientific and theoretical study of the problems of interethnic relations, and arming of students and trainees with effective forms and methods of international education must be an inalienable part of military cadre training in VUZ's.

Now, at the new stage of restructuring, it is important to broadly propagandize the progressive experience of commanding officers and party and Komsomol organizations in uniting multiethnic military collectives, and to publicize how servicemen of different nationalities are successful in mastering military matters and fulfilling their service duty. This is a very important task for the mass media and cultural education establishments. The systematic publication of material on the development of the economy and culture of the union republics and the traditions and customs of the Soviet peoples deserves attention. Collective and individual subscription to the newspapers and journals of the union and autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs should be given greater consideration in units and ships.

KOMSOMOL Paper Criticizes KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Editorial Policy

PM2709154088 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Sep 88 p 2

["Necessary Postscript" by R. Guseynov, editor of the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Department of Propaganda and Military-Patriotic Education, to selection of readers letters in response to 23-28 February 1988 reports from Afghanistan by Ye. Losoto; letters and postscript are published under the rubric "The Eighties: Readers' Diary" and the heading "Mothers and Wives Write In"]

[Text] The selection of letters received in response to the items in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA was already planned when the editorial office received the latest issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Journalist N. Belan categorically denies special correspondent Ye. Losoto's story about the last moments of Major Kovalev's life. A curious detail: Whereas Ye. Losoto described the major's

feat in a report from Afghanistan, N. Belan writes about the same subject in an article from... Stavropol. It cannot be denied that this question is not a simple one. The best answer was that of V. Kovalev's mother, Anna Vladimirovna. In a letter addressed to the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editorial office, she expresses thanks for the truth, however bitter.

One more thing must be said. Recently the central organ of the Defense Ministry has been admirably persistent in "correcting" publications that touch in one way or another on the Soviet Army's problems. This year alone, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has had this "honor" three times. For many years the problems of "bullying" or "nonregulation relations," as military journalists continue to put it so elegantly, were not reflected in the press. Now virtually all the publications write about these matters, with the exception of... KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The main military newspaper's rare mentions of these subjects are reminiscent of the line from the well-known song: "If someone is doing it somewhere, it will sometime happen here...."

I do not want to continue this dispute. We suggest to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that we pool our efforts to resolve other, more important issues than that of defending the honor of the regiment. The late Major Kovalev's aunt, the elderly woman M.V. Silchenko, wrote to us that his parents are "living in terrible conditions." The letter published above from airman Kovalev's widow, Svetlana, rails against cruelty and calls for charity. Are not these the questions that demand urgent resolution? By tackling them we will be defending the honor, not of the regiment, but of the Soviet Army.

Gareyev Interviewed on Effects of Glasnost

PM2309141088 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian

No 39, 24-30 Sep 88 (signed to press 22 Sep) pp 4-5

[Interview with Colonel General M. Gareyev, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent V. Voytenko: "The Armed Forces in the Conditions of Glasnost"; date, place not given; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] Democratization, glasnost—to what extent do these processes affect a traditionally "closed" (for obvious reasons) organization like the USSR Defense Ministry? Or is the specific nature of the activity of military people incompatible with these concepts in general?

Colonel General M. Gareyev, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, answers questions put by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent V. Voytenko.

[Voytenko] Restructuring is taking place in all components of the state mechanism. What form does restructuring take in the Defense Ministry, what are its specific features, what specifically is being restructured, and how?

[Gareyev] Democratization, the reform of the political system, the struggle against bureaucracy, the improvement of ethnic relations, glasnost, and legal reform—all this is taking place in the Armed Forces too, taking account, naturally, of the peculiar nature of military service. As M.S. Gorbachev has stressed, the most important thing is that the efficiency of military organizational development at the present stage should be ensured primarily in terms of qualitative parameters, both as regards hardware and military science and as regards Armed Forces personnel. Military organizational development should guarantee the reliable security of the Soviet state and its allies, and should be carried out in strict accordance with our defensive doctrine.

Many complex new problems are arising in all sectors of the Armed Forces' activity. The fundamental question is whether the military threat to us from the imperialist states is real. Some press organs are beginning to call into question the existence of that threat and the subsequent need for defensive measures, the defense of the fatherland. Our people and all Armed Forces personnel are profoundly and sincerely committed to the ideas of peace and the prevention of war. But the harsh reality is that along with positive changes in the international situation, the imperialist states' military preparations must also be reckoned with.

Therefore, the active struggle for peace and the readiness to rebuff an aggressor must remain organically linked. It is desirable for our entire public to have the correct stance on this issue and help to prepare worthy defenders of their motherland.

In present-day conditions, on the one hand, war is not a fatal inevitability, it can be prevented; but on the other, the real threat of war still exists. Understanding the significance of military duty is becoming increasingly complex, and sometimes people deliberately make it more so. In these conditions the entire system of the military-patriotic, political, and military education of people approaching the draft and of servicemen should be convincing and well-argued, to the highest degree. A higher standard of officer training and combat training of troops and naval forces is also necessary.

A higher standard of military art and combat skill for all personnel—that is an inexhaustible means of further enhancing the combat capability of the Army and Navy, at virtually no additional material cost. This is where we propose to place the main emphasis, without forgetting for a moment that massive professional armies stand against us.

The thrust of the operational and combat training of troops and forces has changed. The main form of combat operations in rebuffing aggression at the beginning of a

war, if war is imposed on us, will be defensive battles and operations. The troops and fleets are devoting particular attention to improving organization, maintaining firm regulation order, and strengthening military discipline.

The defensive nature of military doctrine and the main emphasis on qualitative parameters in the development and training of the Armed Forces require us, on the one hand, to ensure reliable defense in light of the nature of the military threat, and on the other hand, to carry out defense measures within the limits of strict sufficiency, not spurring on the arms race, but on the contrary, doing everything possible to restrain it. Given a military doctrine that is defensive in nature, higher demands are made on combat readiness, since, as historical experience shows, an aggressor preparing for aggression carries out all his preparatory measures for attack beforehand and in secret, while the defensive side is obliged to count on retaliatory actions and must always be ready to rebuff aggression.

[Voytenko] The setting up of an information department under the USSR Council of Ministers was announced in the press recently. What organizational form does the principle of glasnost take at the Defense Ministry?

[Gareyev] The life and activity of the Army and Navy have begun to be more widely covered in the press. In the interest of extending glasnost, press conferences by leading workers at the Defense Ministry and appearances by them before Soviet and foreign journalists have become increasingly widespread recently.

Our military press has performed remarkably in this respect. A wide spectrum of issues concerning all aspects of the troops' life and activity, the development of military theory and practice, Soviet military doctrine, and the technical equipment of the USSR Armed Forces is raised in the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the newspapers of military districts and fleets, and the military journals. Practically all categories of servicemen take part in discussing these issues in the pages of the press. The army press now boldly exposes shortcomings and makes unbiased criticism of Armed Forces officials who commit errors in their service. All this benefits the cause of restructuring the Armed Forces.

At the same time instances of unobjective coverage of individual aspects of the activity of the troops and fleets, a biased approach to individual cases, and distorted interpretations of them do not help to improve the state of affairs in the troops and fleets.

[Voytenko] In the military sphere, there has to be a limit to openness, to provide for keeping secret particular aspects of work, documentary materials, and organizational structures. How is a sensible delimitation being drawn up that will lead us away from excessive secrecy, which undermines trust, but at the same time will not affect the security of our state?

[Gareyev] The Defense Ministry, by virtue of the specific nature of the tasks it resolves, has stricter limitations than other departments on reporting, in the open press or on radio and television, that which relates to the defense capability and security of our state and the Warsaw Pact. The need for this has been confirmed by the experience of past years. Therefore, the importance of vigilance persists, especially since the thrust of the activity of the capitalist countries' intelligence apparatus is obvious.

At the same time, guided by the CPSU's demands for the expansion of glasnost and in light of mutual accords with the United States and NATO, restrictions have been partially lifted in the USSR Armed Forces on various kinds of military information concerning the combat strength, numbers, and technical equipment of troops and naval forces. Many censorship restrictions on tactics and certain types of military hardware have been lifted. The developing process of glasnost has opened up many aspects of the USSR Armed Forces' activity, which makes it possible to acquaint our public more fully with its orientation, and in international terms helps to increase trust and the prestige of Soviet domestic and foreign policy and to establish constructive dialogue between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO at various levels, including the military leadership. If the NATO countries agree to the exchange of information on the numerical strength of the armed forces, this will make it possible to cover this side of the matter more widely in the press too.

As confidence-building measures are widened, questions of further lifting secrecy in the activity of various military departments and making wider information available on the Soviet Armed Forces will be examined. But this process has its limits, because much information that constitutes state and military secrets cannot be unilaterally revealed, in the interests of ensuring the country's reliable defensive capability. Everyone should understand that because virtually every country of the world preserves and protects its state secrets, and especially military secrets, to a greater or lesser degree. Not only problems of defense sufficiency, but also information in the defense sphere is reciprocal in nature and depend on a general improvement in the international situation.

[Voytenko] How has the principle of glasnost already manifested itself; what documents have been published and which are about to be made public?

[Gareyev] The principle of glasnost is manifested in the publication of information that was formerly closed completely, even to specialized publications. Information on the quantitative and qualitative makeup of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces has been published, all our nuclear tests are reported promptly, and the exchange of military delegations, the inviting of foreign military observers to exercises, and visits by representatives of the Western mass media and our own media to garrisons

and specialized facilities of our Armed Forces are becoming increasingly widespread practices. Figures on our losses in Afghanistan have been made available to the world public. The press, radio, and television report on the preparation and conduct of large-scale exercises on the territory of the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries and on the launches of satellites and manned spacecraft. Restrictions have been lifted on the publication in the open press of information on work in connection with the drafting of young recruits into the ranks of the Soviet Army and Navy, the way personnel carry out their military service, the nature of patrol and combat duties, and various other kinds of information that were not formerly made public. The participation of the Armed Forces in combating natural disasters, clearing up after accidents, and building national economic projects is being publicized more widely.

There is wider coverage of phenomena of a negative nature connected with service in the Armed Forces. It is becoming the practice for prominent military leaders to take part in open debates about the organizational development and activity of the Armed Forces.

The possibility is being examined of further releasing some of the archive materials on the Great Patriotic War, including documents on the actual events of its initial period, as well as information on the Soviet-Finnish war, the combat operations at Lake Khasan and the Khalkin-Gol River, the liberation campaigns of 1939-1940, and other events. The latest issue of the VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL publishes Order No 270 of the Red Army Supreme High Command, and certain other documents which have hitherto been closed will be made public. After a careful study of archival documents, it is proposed to publish data on military losses in the period of the Great Patriotic War.

[Voytenko] Another question, this time on concrete military matters. Many readers ask: Why are the NATO countries not reacting very energetically to our proposals put forward in M.S. Gorbachev's speech in the Polish Sejm? What conditions are they putting forward? Are they trying to obtain advantages at our expense?

[Gareyev] The new Soviet initiatives evoked a contradictory reaction in Western countries. There were approving reactions, but the majority were negative. This testifies to the existence within NATO of influential forces that have no interest in advancing the entire disarmament process or substantially lowering the level of military confrontation between the two mightiest military-political groupings.

The greatest objections are prompted by our approach to reducing dual-purpose systems, first and foremost tactical assault aircraft, the exchange of data on armed forces and armaments, and the elimination of the asymmetry between the joint armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the creation of zones with a reduced level of arms.

The majority of NATO countries were also negative about our proposal to remove analogous Warsaw Pact systems from forward basing sites in Eastern Europe if NATO agrees not to site its 72 F-16 fighter-bombers in Italy—those that are presently in Spain. Various objections are put forward, but they all boil down to the same thing: NATO has absolutely no desire to give up those arms in which it has superiority.

The 2 March 1988 Brussels statement of the NATO countries, that NATO policy document, said that the Warsaw Pact "creates a direct threat to security" and that therefore the NATO countries must continue to build up armaments and demand "reductions on the part of the East that are asymmetrical in the highest degree." Here they overplay a certain superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in tanks or artillery, but do not take into account that NATO has superiority over the Warsaw Pact to the tune of nearly 1,500 combat (mainly assault) aircraft, 100 percent superiority in combat helicopters, and 150-200 percent superiority in naval forces.

The same document goes on to say: "...We hope to see Europe united and whole on the basis of Western values and ideals backed up by military strength." But all this is contrary to the pledges adopted by the states at the CSCE and enshrined in its Final Act. And most important, this position is futile.

Yazov on Impact of New Thinking on Armed Forces

LD2109090088 Moscow TASS in English
0841 GMT 21 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 21 TASS—Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov has stressed defense sufficiency as an underlying principle of the Soviet military doctrine, which presupposes steadily scaling down military confrontation levels on the basis of reciprocity, equality and equal security.

Writing in a special issue of NOVOSTI press agency's newsletter on how new political thinking has impacted the Soviet Armed Forces, Yazov, who holds the rank of a general of the Army, added:

"These levels are not determined by us. We are prepared for reducing them drastically, for constructive talks on any issues of cutting armed forces and armaments, for a joint search for solutions and for discussing essential verification measures."

He continued: "Stress first of all on quality meets the specific conditions of the current juncture in world development. It has been dictated, first, by the need to make positive trends in this development irreversible, second, by the possibilities of countering the positions-of-strength policy that are inherent in new political thinking and related approaches to resolving the problems of strengthening international security and peace

and, third, by the fact that emphasis on quantity is becoming not only ever costlier but also ever less effective in both military-political terms and military terms proper."

Stress on quality in defense, according to Yazov, means not building up the battle power of the Armed Forces but maintaining this power at a level excluding military superiority over the Soviet Union and guaranteeing reliable protection for the peaceful work and life of the Soviet people.

Openness Urged on Military Budget, Statistics

PM1909114188 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 17 Sep 88 p 5

[Letter from Candidate of Economic Sciences Yevgeniy Gontmakher under rubric "Reader Proposes, Protests, Polemicizes": "Military Secrets"]

[Text] Moscow—The acuteness of the social problems which have accumulated in the country is known to all. We must construct far more apartments, schools, hospitals, and movie theaters. But there are no capital investments, construction capacities, or materials for this—that is the invariable answer to the economic scientists' proposals in the central planning organs. As a result, despite the increasingly aggravated housing crisis, in the 11th 5-Year Plan (1981-1985) just 7 percent more housing was erected than in 1966-1970; the construction of general education schools, the need for which is still very great, showed a steady tendency to decline; and there was a decrease in the number of hospital beds commissioned, although the situation with regard to the material base of health care could not be worse.

Under the conditions of socialism this situation is not normal. Considerable efforts have been made recently to rectify it; nevertheless additional resources for these purposes are extracted only with great difficulty. The economy has so far failed to acquire a social orientation in its development, and the principle of allocating only leftover funds to the sphere of the improvement of the people's welfare still operates. Which sectors are the first to have their needs met when the social pie is cut? Industry, agriculture, transport? Yes, but that is only half the truth. We would have the whole truth if this traditional list were supplemented by our economy's military-industrial sector.

Imagine the situation in which those engaged in planning the country's social development find themselves: Our military expenditure for them is not only a "top" secret but also an area closed to criticism. How much to spend on defense is decided by a very narrow circle of people without discussion by the USSR Supreme Soviet and its commissions. Can the economic scientists, who are kept in total ignorance, have a say here?

The old doctrine, which viewed the USSR as a fortress under siege, presupposes not simply national economic priority for hypertrophied defense needs but also no hitches in satisfying them. This is directly reflected in the formation of the sum of the funds to be channeled into improving the living standard. Is this doctrine's vitality not an important reason for the present neglect of the country's social sphere?

I think that this could largely be avoided by submitting for discussion by the Supreme Soviet organs the proposed size of the military budget with the relevant justifications, putting these figures into broad scientific and public circulation. From this viewpoint, we can only welcome E.A. Shevardnadze's recent statement on the need to "introduce legislative procedure in accordance with which all departments engaged in military and military-industrial activity will be under the control of the supreme nationwide elected organs. This applies to questions of the use of military force beyond the country's national borders, defense building plans, and the open nature of military budgets in the main areas where they are linked to the problem of national security."

But everything said above applies only to the material and financial funds distributed between our economy's military and civilian sectors. What about manpower resources? It is well known that a certain proportion of the country's adult male population is in the ranks of the armed forces. But exactly what proportion? Strict secrecy in this matter makes it impossible to compile an authentic balance of manpower resources, which considerably reduces the quality of scientific research and preplanning developments affecting people's employment.

Is such secrecy expedient? In the information hall of the USSR Lenin State Library there is free access to an American statistical yearbook which indicates the numerical strength of all countries of the world, of any size. It includes figures for our army.... Of course, the American information may be inaccurate and biased, but this makes it all the more important to make figures on the size of the Soviet Armed Forces open.

In recent years much has been said about how economic science is in debt to actual practice. But to rectify the situation it turns out that the efforts of scientists alone are not enough. The time has come to give them the opportunity to study what are still secret sectors of our national economy.

**19th Party Conference: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
Readers Air Views on Conference Decisions**
*18000584a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Jul 88 p 1*

[Roundup of readers' letters: "Perestroyka: A Matter for Everyone"]

[Text]The decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference are today rightly occupying a central place in the

spiritual life of troops of the army and navy because they affect the radical interests of all the people and are opening up new opportunities and ways to deepen perestroyka. This thought is the leitmotif of the letters arriving at the editorial office from our readers. We publish some of them below.

"How Dare You Criticize..."

In heated discussions on the party conference questions concerning the activity of the party organizations were posed in a new way. And straightaway it was said that now it is necessary to revive in full measure in the party an atmosphere of principledness, openness, debate, criticism and self-criticism, discipline, party comradeship and unconditional personal responsibility and the businesslike approach.

If we talk about our party committee here at the Pacific Ocean Higher Naval School imeni S.O. Makarov, then this revival is proceeding with difficulty. Not long ago, for example, a party meeting was held in the department of combat communications. It was a businesslike and sharp, and the communists assessed their work self-critically and addressed criticism at the school leadership. But in the meeting resolution we wrote the following: "Perestroyka at the school has not been initiated and the command-pressure style of leadership persists in the training and indoctrination program and the activity of the party organization." We did not reach that conclusion lightly and are prepared to substantiate it from all positions with specific proofs.

And then it started. Two days later the chief of the political department at the school, Capt 1st Rank G. Kalitko, gathered together some of the chiefs of department and the secretaries of the party organizations, with no advance notice of the reason for the meeting. He started to ask questions, and then we could see which way the wind was blowing. And finally, after reading the resolution adopted at our party meeting he asked angrily: "How dare you criticize the school in general while you yourselves do nothing?"

There followed a second stage involving a "secret" investigation of the work of our department. This year the examination pass rate for course students has been low. And this can be explained: the department has raised its requirements with regard to student training. But there is no increase in knowledge at the school because to this day no appropriate method of special training has been organized; the communists in the department have raised this matter with the command. Notwithstanding, this situation was used for a quite different purpose than it formally should be and at the end of it all the department chief, Capt 1st Rank V. Gubenko, and certain officials were punished. When this was going on no one showed any interest in the opinion of the communists or of the secretary of the department party organization.

(signed) Capt 2nd Rank L. Sirotin, secretary of the department party bureau.

You Cannot Cover the Waste with Words

I am putting off the day when I have to write the references for the officers who graduated from the Ulyanovsk Higher Command Academy imeni G.K. Ordzhonikidze. "Does not know," "is incapable," "is reluctant"; there will be many such formulations, for example, in the references of lieutenants I. Krotov, N. Dolgikh and I. Yegorov. Because they cannot work with people; well, you will not receive this kind of practice at the school. But they sometimes are incapable of elementary things, both on the plane of knowledge of technical communications facilities and on the plane of organizing exercises. Each of these lieutenants has to have an experienced captain standing there like a nursemaid. But the captain has his own duties, his own responsibilities for his assignments.

It is most likely that at this school they also talk a great deal about the need to improve the qualitative parameters in training for course students. Is it not high time to move on from words to deeds? For waste cannot be covered with words, and in the troops it immediately becomes obvious which VUZ really cares about quality and where fine intentions are still marking time.

Sharp words, perhaps, but check it—it is urgent. Just read the materials of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and like my own words I read the following: "The conference demands consistent and accelerated implementation of the reform of the secondary and higher school"; this is stated in one of the resolutions. I suggest that this demand will be embodied in specific measures that will be undertaken to deepen perestroika in the higher military school also. It is impossible to reconcile ourselves to its present condition. It is a question of the quality parameters of combat readiness.

(signed) Lt Col V. Sukhorukov, Volga Military District.

From the Positions of the Law

Today we have every justification for saying that the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference are providing a powerful impetus for improving the legal guarantees for perestroika and are a basis for the formation of a socialist legal state. Very much work needs to be done in this direction. And as we draft the first outlines of practical plans I would like to say the following.

In order to insure the absolute supremacy of the law in all spheres of our life, including army life, it is essential to change a great deal in the public awareness. And first

and foremost it is essential to improve people's legal knowledge and arrange things so that from their early years all citizens acquire legal knowledge in the closest and most direct way.

In the army and navy, too, it is impossible to get by without general compulsory legal education. For what do we see now? In officers' testimonials we now virtually never see even modest references to the level of their legal competence. One of the most important characteristics that should be considered on a mandatory basis when making appointments to leading posts is essentially not monitored.

One direct consequence of this shortcoming, and sometimes even open legal nihilism, is, for example, the fact that year after year a large number of complaints are received by the military procurator's office at our garrison about incorrect actions by officials. Most often the rights and interests of citizens are being infringed upon when decisions are made about questions of dismissal from work and when people are held administratively or materially liable, and in labor disputes.

And what happens most often is that a particular commander or chief cannot find the time to check that his actions are legal, and does not even suspect that they involve some legal standard. In my opinion, in such cases it is apropos to raise the question in general of the professional suitability of the leader.

However, we also recognize that to some extent a disdainful attitude toward the law sometimes also stems from the fact that some department instructions are obviously at variance with today's realities in life. Even, for example, something as insignificant as a military unit acquiring office supplies now involves an entire problem because only a risible amount of cash can be made available: no more than R2 per purchase.

We think that these anachronisms and imperfections that slow us down should not exist in the legal state. Petty regulations at each step are not essential in order to observe legality.

(signed) Lt Col of Legal Services V. Pochtarev.

War on Bureaucracy

I read the 19th All-Union Party Conference resolution "On the Struggle against Bureaucracy" and I thought: that is what we need today. Need very much! Without a broad offensive against the bastions of bureaucracy everywhere we shall not advance perestroika further.

This also applies in full to our army life. For it also happens with us that a hundred papers must be written just to resolve some insignificant problem. Sometimes it is absurd. At one air force garrison I happened to handle

a document that was extremely indicative in this regard, namely, a report written for the commander of a regiment by a company commander. The junior officer had asked his senior to allocate a bulldozer for work on a supply point. The report included approval from six (!!!) officials giving their instructions to their subordinates on the allocation of the bulldozer. And the final signature was that of the soldier: "I cannot do the work because the bulldozer is out of action."

The question immediately arises: are these intermediate elements necessary since they merely give instructions but carry no responsibility for fixing the equipment? What is the sense in this procedure for resolving these matters when the last word still remains with a specific executor—who is often poorly trained and not always disciplined and responsible?

It is a familiar picture: the business moves like this bulldozer, but a whole stream of paper moves about with increasing speed, the revolutions increase, and much depends on this.

I think that following the adoption of the decisions at the party conference we must once and for all overpower this

misshapen progeny of the time of stagnation. And in my opinion, we must start to follow the party line in the army by implementing a profound, well-considered, comprehensive and sound organizational and staff reform and a decisive reduction in duties that have little effect on the business to hand but instead produce paper and resolutions.

In this connection I would like to touch on a "delicate" matter. In the management apparatus there are sometimes people who at meetings and gatherings and assemblies literally "sit" on the texts of all kinds of statements on training for the leading wing. I think, first, that this is a sign of laziness and haughtiness in leaders. Second, it is proof of their incompetence in matter "vital" to themselves. Third, it is an indicator of double-dyed bureaucracy.

It is time to put an end to it.

(signed) Col V. Ponomarev, Belorussian Military District.

09642

'CPSU CC's Military Expert' on Disarmament in Europe

PM0609155588 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Aug 88 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Report on interview with Major General G. Batenin, CPSU Central Committee military expert, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer M. Ponomarev: "Europe After Warsaw"; date and place not given—first three paragraphs are Ponomarev introduction]

[Text] I got to know Geliy Viktorovich Batenin only a few years ago, when the General Staff involved both of us in work on the brochure "Whence the Threat to Peace" published by the Military Publishing House. Since then our business contacts have continued. From time to time I have had to turn to Geliy Viktorovich, who has now become a major general, for help on various questions. He too has turned to me for help. Each meeting between us has strengthened still further my good opinion about this man and his erudition, professionalism, and ability to clearly formulate a problem and find the most expedient solution.

A certain time ago Maj Gen G. Batenin moved to a new job. He became the CPSU Central Committee's military expert. Our recent meeting was held in his office in the Central Committee building on Staraya Ploshchad. I knew that last month, when the latest Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Conference was being held, Geliy Viktorovich would be there, directly participating in the preparations for it. That is why I asked him to tell KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers about the prospects for European security in light of the decisions of the Warsaw Political Consultative Conference. He readily agreed.

I had no prearranged questions. Our long-standing acquaintanceship allowed us to talk freely. Here are some key points—as I see it—from that talk.

[Batenin] Allow me to say something rather philosophical to begin with. Disarmament as an abiding attribute of civilization is just being conceived before our very eyes. However, this idea is already acquiring real outlines. The Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles has come into force, an agreement on 50-percent cuts in the sides' strategic arms is being gradually worked out, and the process of agreeing on a mandate for talks on pan-European armed forces and conventional arms cuts from the Atlantic to the Urals is on the verge of completion.

Not everything is going smoothly; the necessary pace has not been achieved in everything. The documents adopted at the spring session of NATO leading organs show the magnitude of the inertia of militarist thinking. Orthodox Atlanticists continue to believe that East-West relations should be based not on a balance of interests but on a balance of forces—and that is why reciprocal and balanced disarmament by NATO and the Warsaw Pact does not suit the West. Hence the conclusion that if one type of weapon is reduced, the West

will need compensation in other types. Thus, the land-based nuclear missiles eliminated under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles should be replaced by sea- and air-launched missiles.

Nonetheless, one has to give one's due to the peoples and governments of virtually all European countries for their contribution to the movement for a safer world. Through the Soviet-U.S. "double zero," which excludes two classes of nuclear missile systems from European arsenals at one stroke, Europe has provided the first model of the new thinking. This model is still small, if compared with the magnitude of the problems facing mankind, but it has far-reaching consequences in the sense that it asserts the primacy of political solutions over military solutions.

[Ponomarev] M.S. Gorbachev said precisely that during his visit to Poland.

[Batenin] Quite right. Addressing Polish Sejm deputies, he drew special attention to Europe's historic role in building new principles—based on mutual, identical security—of democratic coexistence and equitable and broad cooperation in relations among countries and peoples. To that end, the Soviet leader pointed out, we need a bold breakthrough in creating a secure and nonmilitarized Europe—a kind of "European Reykjavik." On a practical level, as stressed by the communique of the Warsaw Political Consultative Committee Conference, this means conducting a European dialogue in order to ensure that controlled disarmament on the continent is irreversible and covers all military spheres—both nuclear and nonnuclear.

Such disarmament, as the antithesis of the uncontrolled arms race, is a historically conditioned stage in international relations for our nuclear, space, and electronic era. There is simply no sensible alternative to it, since only disarmament makes it possible to remove the most dangerous threat—the military threat to civilization and the survival of the human race. [Batenin ends]

Talking about the fact that any war would now be fatal for Europe, my interlocutor gave me the impression that it was something he had thought about long and hard. For a continent crammed with hundreds of nuclear power stations, thousands of chemical and metallurgical enterprises, and major hydroengineering installations, nuclear explosions and explosions of modern conventional munitions—which, in terms of power and destructive force, exceed by several orders of magnitude those used during World War II, even though the napalm or pyrophoric bombs that incinerate everything within an area of several dozen hectares can hardly be called "conventional"—would be catastrophic.

Maj Gen Batenin thought for a moment. He was imagining apocalyptic visions of a nuclear conflagration. As an experienced soldier, he can easily picture what that annihilatory fire would be like. Then, wiping his brow as if to rid his mind of these images, he continued:

[Batenin] The fate of Europe, wherever it is decided—Moscow, Brussels, Warsaw, or Bonn—is increasingly bound up with the stability and predictability of the military-political situation and relations between the two European military-political alliances: the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Their combined military strength is striking: 7-7.5 million men with powerful modern arms—aircraft, tanks, missiles, artillery, and navies.

I would particularly like to note (the general emphasized this idea with a gesture) that the emergence of a military conflict in Europe caused by the deliberate actions of political leaders of states on different sides of the dividing line between the two sociopolitical systems is unlikely. But that does not rule it out. In my view, psychological rather than social factors are most dangerous now; it is they that could lead to a deterioration in the situation that might even render it irreparable. Such psychological instability has its own rationale. First and foremost, there is the "abundance" of arms in Europe and the unresolved problem of disarmament in the conventional warfare sphere. This disarmament should be conducted by substantially cutting the Warsaw Pact and NATO troop groupings on the continent in the entire area from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The most immediate aim here could be formulated as follows: The strike aircraft and tank formations of the groupings targeted against each other should be eliminated. Here, too, the psychological barrier which still divides Europeans into "us" and "them" and gives new life to obsolete stereotypes of the "enemy on the other side of the border" should be removed.

[Ponomarev] I think that, in light of what you have said, now is the time to move to the crux of the decisions made in Warsaw—I said, making use of a moment when Geliy Viktorovich was lighting his pipe.

[Batenin] We have every reason to claim—he said, striking a match—that the Political Consultative Committee Conference in Warsaw, which ended with the adoption of major final documents, sensitively captured the moment by updating the concept of armed forces and arms reduction in Europe put forward and supplemented at the Budapest and Berlin conferences in 1986 and 1987. It is planned to implement this concept in principle in three interlinked and coordinated but relatively independent stages.

Stage one involves the achievement of approximately equal and balanced collective levels of armed forces and conventional arms for the states in the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This process would be carried out on both a pan-European and regional scale by means of the reciprocal eradication of imbalances and asymmetries in certain kinds of arms and armed forces. Unlike the existing balance of military forces in Europe, a lower balance with no asymmetries would be established as a result. According to calculations by a number of specialists, the main asymmetries in NATO's favor currently

amount to approximately a 50-percent advantage in tactical strike aircraft and military helicopters, while the Warsaw Pact has a 2:1 advantage in tanks.

Stage two involves reciprocal armed forces cuts of approximately 25 percent (almost 500,000 men on each side) together with their standard-issue arms. The creation along the demarcation line between the two alliances of zones (strips) of reduced arms levels achieved primarily by withdrawing from them or cutting the most dangerous and destabilizing types of conventional arms (tanks, long-range artillery, tactical missiles, fighters, bombers, and ground-attack aircraft) should be an inalienable part of such reductions.

Stage three involves the further continuation in terms of time and geography of the armed forces and conventional arms reduction process in Europe with a view to making them strictly defensive and ensuring that the two sides both achieve the minimum levels of military potentials to provide for defense and to rule out the possibility of a surprise attack.

[Ponomarev] But are we only talking about conventional arms?

[Batenin] No, not just conventional arms. The Warsaw communique particularly stresses the priority of nuclear disarmament. This problem is viewed on two levels, as it were: the need to include in the arms to be cut (scrapped) both tactical nuclear weapons and dual-purpose systems which can be configured for nuclear as well as conventional warfare. The Warsaw Pact states are proposing to start talks on reducing and subsequently eliminating tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including the nuclear components of dual-purpose systems, in the near future and without delaying things.

The demilitarization of European relations is dialectically linked with the enhancement of mutual trust. This is very substantive. Reciprocal exchanges of information on the sides' armed forces, arms, and the nature and scale of their military activity should be a stimulating factor in this area, as should an effective system for verifying the fulfillment of accords, a system which could be based both on national technical means and on international procedures, including on-site inspection on demand.

The Warsaw statement on talks on armed forces and conventional arms reduction in Europe raises a fundamentally important issue which, through NATO's fault, has still not been resolved—namely, the scope of the confidence-building measures pertaining to the sides' air and naval forces and the development and adoption for all their armed forces components of new-generation confidence-building measures, including some of a restrictive nature. This particularly means measures that would limit the scale and number of simultaneous troop

exercises and the duration and regularity of such exercises, prohibit large-scale maneuvers, and restrict the opportunity to transfer forces and means within stipulated strips and zones.

[Ponomarev] The international public and the NATO countries' political and military circles are attentively analyzing the broad range of Soviet and Warsaw Pact initiatives adopted in the Polish capital. One important initiative is the proposal that the West set up a pan-European war risk reduction center. In what sense is this new and original?

[Batenin] In the sense, I think, that it was the first proposal to set up a suprabloc structure for mutual East-West relations on the continent. The functional tasks of such a center could increase as progress is achieved in the disarmament and security-strengthening process. Initially, the center would be a body independent of propaganda influence and semiofficial bodies on either side, and it would be able to assess the military-strategic situation in and around Europe. Its main task would be to provide timely and objective information on the situation, particularly in regions that are in possible operational areas—military regions, as a rule. It would define the geostrategic position of both European military-political alliances. It is understandable that the main aim of such a center's work would be to avert factors posing the threat of surprise attack and to remove elements of tension in the sphere of East-West military-political relations. Needless to say, such a European center should have highly efficient information sources and "hotlines" to the military and political leaderships both of individual alliance members and to the alliances themselves—the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

This is a new proposal, Geliy Viktorovich stressed. I would like to draw attention to another militarily and

politically interesting proposal made by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in the Polish Sejm. I am referring to the USSR's readiness to withdraw analogous aircraft systems from forward bases in Eastern Europe if NATO agrees not to deploy in Italy the 72 U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers being moved from Spain.

The political point of such a proposal is clear. It would be the first bilateral action aimed quite far into Europe's future with regard to reducing the presence of troops and arms on foreign territories. Moreover, a reciprocal withdrawal of tactical strike aircraft—which are precisely the weapons in which there exist both a regional and general numerical asymmetry in the European theater—would symbolize the ability and resolve of the Warsaw Pact and NATO to eradicate "annoying" imbalances not in words but in deeds.

The military significance of the basing "switch" for the NATO F-16 aircraft and similar Warsaw Pact aircraft lies in the fact that such aircraft are nuclear-capable. Reciprocal security will only be increased if these aircraft, which can each carry two to three nuclear bombs, are removed from the dividing line between the blocs to a distance far in excess of their combat radius. [Batenin ends]

Our talk was drawing to a close. Gen Batenin had by no means given a complete list of the specific proposals recently voiced at Warsaw that reaffirm our readiness to continue to pursue our international policy in an enterprising, realistic, constructive, and flexible way, as required by the new political thinking, in the security interests of our own country, the entire socialist community, and Europe, and for the good of the whole world. But what was said painted a tangible picture of Europe after Warsaw—the Europe of the future.

Call for Naval, Air Measures at Stockholm Talks
PM3008111288 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 34, 21 Aug 88 p 5

[Interview with Soviet Stockholm CSCE delegation member Major General Viktor Tatarnikov by Vladimir Nazarenko: "It Is Time To Count Aircraft And Warships"]

[Text] The Vienna meeting of 35 states—participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—is discussing the resumption of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building and Disarmament in Europe.

Soviet delegation member Major-General Viktor Tatarnikov spoke with "MN" correspondent Vladimir Nazarenko.

MN: What new confidence-building measures should be considered at the next session of the Stockholm conference?

V.T.: Confidence-building measures related to the military activities of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO land forces in Europe are being efficiently implemented. The activities of the ground-based formations have become, within certain limits, open, verifiable, and, consequently, more predictable.

But naval activities and independent air force exercises, unfortunately, remain major "blank" spots in the process of confidence-building measures and security. In fact, the navy and the air force dispose an unprecedented striking force with a vast range and high accuracy. The military activities of naval and air forces are potentially highly dangerous given preparations for delivering surprise attacks. By means of these forces the NATO states exerted military pressure on other countries, blackmailed and intimidated them, and in some cases, bombed them. Remember Libya.

Therefore the Warsaw Treaty countries and some other European states believe that it is time to monitor naval and air force activities in Europe and in the seas and oceans adjoining it, and make this activity open and predictable. I think this work should be started at the next session of the Stockholm conference.

MN: What specific confidence-building measures would this involve?

V.T.: Measures similar to those for military activities on land: to include major air force and navy war games in the annual plans of notified military activities, notification on independent naval and air force exercises and other actions exceeding certain thresholds. Naval and air force activities at sea and in the air space adjoining Europe and the landing of major troops should also be monitored. The plan should include a compulsory notification on troop and military hardware transports to Europe by sea and by air. Finally, the conference should

consider the banning of naval exercises in the areas of intensive navigation and fishing; limiting naval forces, especially anti-submarine forces, in areas of international importance. It could also discuss other measures dealing with the activity of naval and air forces, including strict control, right up to inspection without the right of refusal. The spreading of these and other measures to naval and air force activities would be a timely and quite logical step, especially given Western appeals for predictable, verifiable and open approach to military sphere.

MN: For a number of years the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries have repeatedly proposed considering this problem in the framework of the European forum. Initiatives were made at the highest levels by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok, in Murmansk and Belgrade, and by Nikolay Ryzhkov in Sweden. Were these appeals and statements acted on?

V.T.: Addressing the Polish Sejm recently Gorbachev proposed withdrawing Soviet aircraft from forward-based areas in Eastern Europe, on the condition that NATO not deploy 72 American F-16 fighter-bombers in Italy. The West was actually offered a "zero option"—and flatly rejected it.

Another example. On July 25, 1988, the Soviet Government, striving to solve, as soon as possible, the problem of confidence-building measures at sea, announced it would be conducting naval exercises with the Baltic Fleet on September 6-8, 1988. A total of 32 warships, aircraft and helicopters will participate. Military observers from the GDR, Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland—the states directly concerned with the military and strategic situation in the Baltic—were invited. This new practical step in the history of naval activity is unprecedented, removing the veil of secrecy from the USSR naval activity. Similar steps by NATO would be very apropos.

We are hoping for reciprocity.

19th Party Conference: Officer Discusses Legal Reforms in Context of Military Regulations
18000582 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jun 88 p 2

[Article by A. Kovlikov, retired colonel of justice, doctor of juridical sciences, professor: "Legal Guarantees of Democratization"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference define long-term prospects for the development of the Soviet state and law under the conditions of restructuring. The goal of the work which has begun is specific: to complete, in the process of democratization of society, the creation of a lawful socialist state, the main and basic feature of which is the supremacy and triumph of the law, which expresses the people's will.

Serious changes in the state and legal area are, of course, reflected in the life of the USSR Armed Forces as well and require the re-examination of a number of aspects of military legislation and the further strengthening of military order.

How can we ensure the supremacy of law in the army's life and activities? What does this presuppose? Above all, it requires the strict conformity of all norms of military legislation of the USSR Constitution with all other laws of the USSR and the Union republics. In other words, general military regulations, all of our directions and instructions and any order by a commander or chief should conform to the law and ensue from a proper understanding and interpretation of these norms, established by higher state authorities.

Is it possible to raise the authority of the legal agencies which regulate servicemen's life even higher? It is possible, and in this regard it is necessary. It seems that there are grounds for raising the question of whether the legislature—the USSR Supreme Soviet—should approve general military regulations, the importance of which cannot possibly be overestimated. Certainly this would not only elevate the legal status of the regulations but would also noticeably affect their content, not to mention their stability.

The same can also be said for the normative acts which set the procedure for serving in the military. Indeed, will we not gain if they are adopted as law? Undoubtedly, it is considerably easier and simpler to change a governmental decree than a law. On the other hand, however, the legal position of servicemen should, after all, be stable.

In my opinion, the law and not various other types of legal acts should determine the grounds for ensuring military order and should establish the rights and responsibilities of servicemen and of one or another social institution within the units and subunits. In this connection, it seems to me, it would be appropriate to formulate a requirement within the military regulations to the effect that every order must conform to the law.

Democratization under the conditions of the Armed Forces above all entails a decisive increase in the activeness of all servicemen, of military collectives on the whole and of all of their social organizations in the main sector—in strengthening order and increasing military efficiency and readiness. This, it seems, is clear to everyone, given the appropriate legal and other guarantees. In this sense, it is extremely important to evaluate the present-day legal status of the collectives of military units, ships and subunits. Can we claim today that this status leaves room for democratization? Hardly. The rights of military, as opposed to labor, collectives are not regulated by any single normative act whatsoever. There are, for instance, references to meetings of subunit personnel for the public censure of violators of military discipline, and to meetings of ensigns, warrant officers and officers. These are in the Disciplinary Regulations. However, the nature of the decisions which such a

meeting has the right to make is vague. On the basis of law, an interdepartmental procedure was established for holding servicemen's meetings for the purpose of electing or recalling the people's assessors of military tribunals. A number of specific rights have been granted to military, as well as labor, collectives by procedural legislation, namely, the right to petition for transfer on bail, for suspended conviction or a lifted conviction, for permission to have a public prosecutor or public defender participate in a court session, and others. According to established tradition, these rights can be realized only if the corresponding petition was supported by a commander, although, strictly speaking, there is no such stipulation within the procedural law itself. The regulations of a number of other laws granting various legal rights to labor collectives have also been applied to military collectives, taking the specific conditions of military service into account. It seems to me that it is time to legally reinforce all rights of military collectives of units and subunits. In this connection, it would be proper and wise to solve the principle question, that of the correlation between the rights of the commander in chief and of the military collective. This could be achieved by including special addenda within the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, which would regulate the powers of military collectives. In the same manner, it would be appropriate to define the procedure for holding servicemen's meetings and the making of decisions by them, although we should also draft a separate normative act on this subject.

We extensively utilize the Comrades' Courts, a democratic means of involving society in the struggle against negative phenomena. There are laws regarding them. The Comrades' Courts of Honor for officers, ensigns, warrant officers and re-enlisted servicemen, functioning in the Armed Services, make their own contribution to strengthening law and order and to the upbringing of servicemen. However, at the present time Comrades' Courts do not exist for privates and sergeants who are serving their statutory term. Incidentally, such courts were created in the Red Army's first years of existence. V.I. Lenin attached great significance to them. Comrades' Courts existed for everyone, regardless of service ranks, during the Great Patriotic War as well. Today, it is difficult to explain why privates and sergeants were at some stage deprived of the right to examine violations of law and misdemeanors committed by their comrades and to make decisions in this connection which reflect the collective's will. The lack of such courts does more than impoverish the arsenal for upbringing. According to law, the military prosecutor and military tribunal can in a number of cases dismiss a criminal case, when the accused does not pose a public threat, and transfer the case to the Comrades' Court for examination. Yet, what if there is no such court? In such a case, the private or sergeant is either held criminally accountable or he turns out to be beyond any legal influence.

The criminal law reform is currently being drafted. In particular, it proposes a more extensive use of measures for social influence on law-breakers. I believe that this again obligates us to study the problem of re-establishing Comrades' Courts for privates and sergeants who are serving the statutory term, and to draft a corresponding legislative act.

It is difficult to conceive of the process of democratization without strengthening the individual's legal defense or expanding the guarantees of citizens' rights and freedoms. This is also true with respect to the Armed Forces. Here, it seems to me, we must also take into consideration the present-day negative attitude of a certain segment of young people toward military service, caused to some extent by cases of the humiliation of individual dignity and the violations of the individual's rights which occur in the military. I am referring to so-called "non-regulation interrelations." Military service should take place under conditions of reliable legal guarantees for individuals. The necessity of these guarantees is stipulated, moreover, by the humane nature of our system, by the very essence of socialism, in which the individual is of the highest value.

The laws and regulations of the Armed Forces define the serviceman's legal status in such a way as to ensure the protection of his constitutional rights and freedoms, naturally, within a framework which takes the specific conditions of a military organization into account. In my opinion, this framework needs considerable expansion. What do I have in mind? The general military regulations describe the general, official and special duties of servicemen in great detail. Yet the regulations virtually do not define servicemen's rights in any direct form, although these rights are contained in other normative acts and implied in a number of regulation statutes. Incidentally, we do not assert that there are no rights without responsibilities or responsibilities without rights for no reason. Our regulations, of course, would be better if they contained statutes on the rights of servicemen and their basic guarantees in a direct form.

Due to the specific nature of military service, certain limitations on the servicemen's individual rights and freedoms are unavoidable. However, the interests of the matter require that this be directly stipulated by law according to the principle of the minimally permissible. It would be beneficial to introduce a norm within the regulations which prohibits placing any sort of limitation upon the rights of servicemen which is not stipulated by law or by the regulations themselves. The principle "anything not forbidden by law is permitted," which has received much publicity of late, can and should find reflection in military legislation, not affecting the fundamentals of military law and order, such as one-man command, unquestioning obedience to orders and the strict regimentation of everyday life.

Everyone knows that criminal law stipulates strict accountability for criminal infringement upon life, health, honor and dignity, and personal freedom and property. Servicemen, like all other citizens, are guaranteed the right to legal defense against such infringements. As of 15 December 1983, by decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Law on Criminal Accountability for Military Crimes was supplemented by an article stipulating criminal accountability for violent actions by one servicemen with regard to another, when

both are of equal rank. Previously, such actions were not included among military crimes and the guilty parties were punished either for hooliganism or for crimes against an individual, regardless of the fact that they cause great damage to military law and order. The addendum to the law put everything in its proper place. Conditions were created for the more decisive and juridically accurate struggle against these disgraceful phenomena. Yet all the same... The definition itself of the crime as a "violation of statutory rules for interrelations" is rather diffident and vague, and therefore imperfect. One might get the impression that it is a matter of some harmless sort of thing. After all, statutory interrelations cover a very broad scope. Why not just directly state that it refers to the infliction of beatings, causing bodily injuries and other types of insults to fellow servicemen? Criminal law strives to call things what they are—premeditated murder, assault, banditry, threatening a chief, violence toward a chief, etc. In such a case, the law would have been violated.

The procedure for examining servicemen's suggestions, declarations and complaints must also not escape attention. Today it is regulated by the statutes of Chapter 5 of the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, yet only with regard to causing damage to the Armed Forces or to illegal actions on the part of commanders and violation of the serviceman's rights. Yet, what if the serviceman wants to make a suggestion or declaration of a different nature, for instance, related to the further strengthening of the Armed Forces? Of course, he has not been deprived of that right. The laws currently in effect do not forbid him from turning to the military prosecutor's office with declarations and complaints, or from complaining of unjust actions by officials who damaged his rights as a citizen, within the limits set by law. It would be desirable to reflect all such situations within the military regulations.

Firm guarantees of the democratization of life in the Armed Forces are inconceivable without improvements, the development of military legislation, and the introduction within it of new ideas, born of restructuring and dictated by the times.

13362

General Gareyev Writes on 70th Anniversary of Armed Forces

18010319 Moscow OKTYABR in Russian
No 2, Feb 88 pp 175-183

[Article by Col Gen M. Gareyev under rubric "Social and Political Journalism and Feature Articles" commemorates 70 years of Soviet Army: "Great October and Defense of the Motherland"]

[Text] The Soviet Armed Forces have been defending the achievements of the Great October Socialist Revolution for 70 years. Looking back on the road that has been travelled, we once again are also trying to understand,

from today's perspective, Lenin's behests on the defense of the Motherland, the lessons of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War, and contemporary experience in the organizational development and training of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Peace without war and weapons has always been a socialist ideal. As far back as the period of the first world war, the Bolshevik party called for an end to imperialistic wars and the conclusion of a just democratic peace. A Decree on Peace was adopted the second day after the October victory which outlined the main direction of the foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government for all of the succeeding years.

The Brest peace was concluded in the dramatic months of the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918. V. I. Lenin and key personnel of the leadership of our party opposed the Trotskyite slogan about "exporting the revolution," and, despite very difficult conditions, came out in support of peace. They proceeded from the fact that the preservation and strengthening of Soviet power was the most effective form of international assistance to the international proletariat. It was then that the principles of the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries were established, which the Soviet Union has consistently adhered to all these years.

The attitude toward an armed defense of the achievements of the revolution was determined on the basis of a Leninist peace-loving policy.

As is known, the classics of Marxism-Leninism initially considered it necessary to wreck the bourgeois state machine, including such of its attributes as the army and the police. They were convinced that the national police would become an armed safeguard of the revolution.

However, the conditions under which the Armed Forces of our country were created after the victory of the October revolution were significantly different from those that existed at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. The main feature was that the socialist revolution, as was indeed foreseen by V. I. Lenin, was victorious in only one country, which found itself in a hostile capitalist encirclement in the very first days of its existence. The imperialist states imposed an intervention and a civil war on us, and the need for another approach to the organization of the defense of the achievements of socialism.

Military affairs became significantly complicated after the first world war. Under these conditions, the scanty and poorly trained and armed volunteer units and police formations were in no condition to oppose the superior and well-organized forces of the numerous enemies of the revolution.

Taking the existing situation into consideration, the party came to the conclusion that there was only one way

to defend Soviet rule in the prevailing state of emergency—the creation of a regular, massive and well-organized and trained army. Such an army could not be built on a volunteer principle; it was necessary to switch to compulsory military service for the male population and to introduce universal military training of the workers and peasants. This was a principally new resolution of the question on the organization of the Armed Forces of the socialist state.

The 8th Congress RKP_b [Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] approved the Leninist policy of military organization and the creation of a class, regular army that was centrally controlled.

The creation of such an army was one of the most important factors leading to the defeat of the campaign of 14 foreign states and the domestic counterrevolution against Soviet rule.

As M. S. Gorbachev noted in his report in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "The party rallied and mobilized the people in the defense of the socialist Motherland and the gains of October. Hungry, ragged and barefoot, the poorly armed Red soldiers routed a well-trained and equipped counterrevolutionary army which was well fed by the imperialist West and East."

Our military doctrine even then had a defensive character in a political context, inasmuch as the Red Army had never attacked anyone, but was forced to defend the gains of the revolution. At the 13th Congress of the party, M. V. Frunze said: "I consider it a very harmful, foolish and childish venture to talk now about offensive wars on our part."

V. I. Lenin considered that the management of the Armed Forces and all matters of strengthening the defensive capability of the country was the highest socio-political principle of military organizational development.

The party paid a lot of attention to the development and practical implementation of the principles of the unity of the army and the people and the friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism, which was one of the most important sources of the internal solidarity and combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces. Addressing representatives of various nations and soldier-internationalists, V. I. Lenin said: "A great honor has fallen to you to defend sacred ideas with weapons in hands and . . . to make the international brotherhood of peoples a reality."

In contrast to bourgeois parties and states, which hypocritically mask the anti-popular essence of imperialist armies, our party and Soviet rule from the very beginning openly proclaimed the principle of a class approach to the organizational development of the Armed Forces and those called to defend the interests of the workers. At the same time the party examined the class approach to the acquisition of manpower for the army as a temporary

phenomenon, bearing in mind that, after the elimination of the exploiting classes and the victory of socialism, it would be transformed into a national army, which subsequently did occur.

The most important principles of Soviet military organizational development are centralism, one-man command and iron discipline which are the indispensable conditions of the combat capability of the Armed Forces, and without which the army and the navy cannot perform as a united and organized force.

V. I. Lenin raised the question of centralism and one-man command on principle and without any reservations. "Irresponsibility," he said, "that is concealed by references to collective leadership is a very dangerous evil that threatens all those who do not have very much experience in the matter of collective leadership work and which in military affairs quite often leads inevitably to catastrophe, chaos, panic, multiple authority and defeat."

He considered the introduction of the institution of military commissariats in the period of the civil war to be a temporary and compulsory measure under prevailing extraordinary historical conditions, when there was an insufficient number of command cadres that were ideologically hardened and dedicated to the revolution, and it became necessary to attract military specialists of the old army, when hostile elements could penetrate the Red Army. The changes carried out in the Red Army in the years 1924-1925, the reinforcement of organs of military control with experienced party cadres and ridding them of Trotskyites created the conditions for the introduction of one-man command into the army and navy.

The rejection of one-man command and the return to the institution of military commissars in the 1930's and in 1941, as historical experience has shown, was not sufficiently justified. The harsh reality of war made it necessary in each case to reinstitute one-man command, which we always implemented on a party basis.

The Leninist conception of one-man command as the only correct organization of work and as the most expedient method of command and control of troops remains unshakable under current conditions as well.

Attaching great importance to centralism and one-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces, much attention was paid from the very beginning of their creation to training personnel in the spirit of conscientious military discipline and to the development of democratic principles.

The elements of democratism were strong in our Armed Forces at all times, but for a number of different reasons they were not always properly displayed and utilized in full measure. During the period of the civil war, and at times in the 1920's and 1930's as well, this resulted in a misunderstanding of the necessity for unquestioned obedience to the orders of commanders, and this had to be

decisively corrected after the Finno-Soviet war of 1939-1940. In turn, one-man commanders were not always able to be guided by party and Komsomol organizations and to activate and fully utilize the creativity and initiative of personnel.

Under current conditions, when restructuring is being implemented in the country and in the Armed Forces, there is a need, along with a further strengthening of one-man command, for activation and utilization of the human factor in every way possible. In this connection, greater democratization of the methods of work of military councils, party and Komsomol organizations, officer assemblies, sports committees, women's councils and other social organizations also becomes a task of restructuring.

After the end of the civil war, in 1921, the central committee of our party sent a letter to all party organizations which said: "The party has decided. . . that the army must be retained and that its combat capability must be raised. . . We will commit a terrible crime against the revolution if we forget this." It was planned at that time to introduce the kind of military organization that would take into full account both the danger of imperialist aggression and the internal capabilities of the Soviet state.

The 10th Congress of the party rejected the aims of Trotsky and his supporters to convert the Armed Forces immediately into a militia system, recognizing them to be incorrect and extremely dangerous under conditions of a complicated international situation and the unceasing efforts of imperialism to suffocate the young Soviet republic.

During the years 1924-1924, by a decision of the CC of the party and the Soviet government, major changes were made in the Armed Forces in order to increase their combat capability. On instructions of the party, M. V. Frunze directly managed their implementation.

The organizational development of the Red Army moved along two lines: first, along the line of improving the organizational structure and increasing the combat readiness of cadres of large units [soyedineniye] and units [chast]; and, secondly, along the line of developing and introducing a territorial militia system.

By 1925 the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces was reduced from 5.5 million persons to 562,000 persons. However, while in an organizational sense the Red Army was no longer inferior to the largest armies of the capitalist countries, it still remained very small numerically and especially weak in a technical sense.

Persistent work in improving the organizational development of the Armed Forces was continued in the succeeding years also. The growing threat of war demanded urgent measures in further increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, and first and foremost, increasing their technical level of equipment. History posed this

question in a very stark way: we had to overcome the economic and technical backwardness of the country and strengthen defenses, or we would not be able to preserve the freedom and independence of the Soviet republic. This task was essentially solved through the heroic efforts of the party and the Soviet people. The Soviet Union was vitally interested in maintaining small armed forces, but the intensified preparation for a second world war by Germany and other capitalist states compelled us gradually to increase their strength.

As the Great Patriotic War subsequently demonstrated, with respect to a majority of the main and most fundamental questions, the basic direction of the organizational development of our Armed Forces was established correctly and was implemented with due regard for the nature of the forthcoming war. Of decisive importance was the farsighted and scientifically based approach to such problems as the mobilization of all forces of the state to strengthen the defense of the country, the creation of a large-scale regular army, the rational combination and proportional development of all types of Armed Forces and combat arms, the relationship of man and technology in war, and others. However, up to the beginning of the war, not everything that had been planned was fully completed, especially with regard to the mass production of new tanks, aircraft and other types of weapons.

In conjunction with this, it would be incorrect to assert that all of the propositions of our theory and practice were faultless and comprehensively developed prior to the war. Many writings devoted to the history of the Great Patriotic War state that on the eve of the war Soviet military theory did not take into account the possibility of a surprise invasion by major enemy forces, that it did not adequately develop the forms and methods of conducting a strategic defense, and that questions of defense on a strategic-operational scale were very poorly developed in a practical way. However, one of the most complicated tasks that the Soviet Supreme High Command had to accomplish in the very first days of the war was the organization and conduct of strategic defense.

Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov wrote regarding this question: "In reworking operational plans during the spring of 1941 the particular features of conducting a modern war in its initial period were not fully considered in practice. The people's commissar of defense and the general staff believed that war between such major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should start in accordance with an earlier existing pattern: the main forces enter into battle several days after border engagements. With respect to periods of concentration and deployment, fascist Germany was positioned under conditions similar to ours. Actually, both the forces and the conditions were far from equal."

These conditions on the eve of the war required the adoption of a series of urgent measures for the early concealed deployment of armed forces and their preparation to repulse aggression. In the first half of 1941, the

people's commissar of defense and the general staff twice approached I. V. Stalin with a proposal on these questions, but they were not adopted, as was said at that time, because of "higher political considerations." Stalin still hoped in that period that war could be avoided.

A fatal role was also played by a TASS report of 14 June 1941 which officially refuted "rumors" about the possibility of a fascist Germany attack on the Soviet Union, and it expressed confidence that Germany would continue to abide by the non-aggression pact.

After the war it was explained that this was a political probe for the purpose of finding out how the leadership of Hitlerite Germany would react to the report. If this action is examined abstractly, only from the point of view of political considerations, it would appear to be an ordinary matter. Why not explore the existing situation once more? But in this case the fact was not taken into account that any official announcement in our press would be perceived as a directed line of the political leadership, but no other instructions in this regard were given to command elements of districts and fleets.

A lot could have been done on the initiative of commanders of district and fleet forces. But baseless repressions in the 1930's eliminated the most experienced and capable commanders and political workers from the army, and inadequately prepared young cadres took their place. In addition, they were intimidated and hamstrung and were afraid to undertake any kind of important measures without the approval of higher authority.

It is impossible to judge the failures of 1941 in isolation from all of this. The harsh lessons of the past attest to the fact that an abstract policy does not and cannot exist in a pure form. Policy, also including foreign policy, can be vital only when it takes all conditions of the situation into complete account: international, economic, ideological, and not least of all, the interests of resolving defense tasks.

An important fact was overlooked at a certain moment on the eve of the war, that in the event of the initiation of military operations it was not possible to proceed in a military and in a political sense only on the basis of personal desires and convictions, not taking into account the fact that an enemy will strive to do everything when and whether it is convenient and advantageous for him.

Everyone understands that it was important for the Soviet Union at that time to gain time, to win at least a year or two to ready the state for defense. But the fascist bosses also unquestionably understood that within a year or two, even by their own risky calculations, the chances of success would be significantly less. Therefore, they relied mainly on a surprise attack and on the use of those temporary advantages that were available to them.

In practice, all of this led to the fact that at the time fascist Germany attacked the USSR our first echelon divisions were located at their permanent garrisons, and

only at the initiation of hostilities did they begin to move out to the state border to meet the enemy's attacking tank groupings. What all of this led to is well-known.

And in this extremely difficult situation, which was conditioned by objective and subjective causes, the entire course and outcome of the war was predetermined by the advantages of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the socialist social and state system. Underlying these decisive factors, which ensured our victory, was the profound faith of a majority of the Soviet people in the correctness of the idea of the October revolution, because as a result of the socialist transformation of our society in practice they were convinced that Soviet rule was actually their rule, which reflected the vital interests of the workers.

If one recalls the full gravity of the oppression and poverty of a majority of the people of czarist Russia, then it is not difficult to understand how the simple Soviet citizen valued the elimination of man's exploitation by man, unemployment and a guaranteed right to work, the acquisition by peasants of land from Soviet authority, real assurance of the equal rights of nations, wide access of the popular masses to culture, free health care, education, and much else.

No distortions of the principles of socialism and justice could cancel all of these revolutionary gains. And therefore the people and their Armed Forces under the leadership of the Communist Party indeed fought selflessly for the honor and independence of their native land, and in behalf of the defense of the cause of the October revolution.

And in the years 1941 and 1942, despite all adversities, and at times in desperate moments, it was the steadfastness of our soldiers, commanders and political workers, and their belief in the justice of our cause, that made it possible to withstand and to stop the enemy offensive. But after the battles at Moscow and Stalingrad we were fighting in an entirely different way. The country had increased the production of tanks and weapons, and the command cadres and all personnel, having gone through severe combat hardening, began to surpass the enemy more and more in the level of military art and combat skill.

As always in a difficult time, the people and the army brought forth such talented military leaders as G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevskiy, I. S. Konev, K. K. Rokossovskiy, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, I. D. Chernyakhovskiy, and many others who through their courage and military creativeness brought glory to our Motherland and to the Soviet Armed Forces.

Supreme High Commander I. V. Stalin, who did much for victory through his purposefulness, will, and ability to discipline the people, began to understand more and

more that military affairs also have their own special conformity to natural laws, that not everything here is superficial and that, as V. I. Lenin bequeathed, they have to be studied properly.

Approximately in the middle of the war, Headquarters Supreme High Command developed an efficient system of decision-making in the conduct of the most important operations with the active participation of the general staff and the commanders of combat arms, fronts and fleets. This facilitated making a sober estimate of the enemy and the capabilities of our own troops and arriving at the most expedient decisions and methods of conducting operations, taking into account the specific conditions of a situation, which ensured the outstanding victories at Kursk in 1943, the execution of a number of brilliant operations in 1944, and the Vistula-Oder, Berlin and Manchurian operations in 1945.

During the course of the war, the Soviet Army conducted dozens of different operations and all of them differed in the novelty of the methods of operations that were employed, which the enemy did not expect. The development of flexible forms of preparation for and the conduct of defensive operations with a subsequent shift to a counter-offensive, the theory of strategic offensive operations, the resolution of problems of the operational and strategic breakthrough of enemy defenses with a subsequent encirclement, new methods of combat employment and coordination of the different services of the Armed Forces and combat arms, such an effective form of fire engagement of enemy targets as artillery and air offensives, new forms and methods of building order of battle, all-round support of operations and firm command and control of troops—these and many other questions that were resolved in a new way during the war retain their value under modern conditions to a certain degree.

As a result of the defeat of fascism and victory in the second world war, in which the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces played a decisive role, the entire international situation changed radically. Instead of one socialist country, a whole community of socialist countries appeared. The colonial system collapsed, and many people received their freedom and proceeded on a path of independent development. The economic might and international authority of the Soviet Union grew.

But all of this did not suit imperialist circles. Therefore, at the very end of the war, without any military necessity and with far-reaching political objectives, atomic bombs were dropped on peaceful Japanese cities, and immediately after the war the "cold war" was unleashed.

With more and more new facts, historical experience and contemporary life confirm the Leninist proposition that "politically, imperialism in general strives for violence and reaction."

The new version of the CPSU Program emphasizes that "imperialism is the perpetrator of two world wars that took tens of millions of lives. It creates the threat of a third world war." At a meeting of representatives of the party and movements in November of 1987, Gus Hall and other leaders of the Communist Party definitively confirmed this conclusion. A certain transformation of capitalism has occurred under the current conditions, and the leaders of capitalist countries cannot but consider the realities of the nuclear age. Taking all of this into account, imperialism can maneuver and adapt itself to the new conditions. But in its very nature, it cannot make peace and the security of peoples the ultimate objective of its policy.

The destruction of the world system of socialism and affirmation of U.S. hegemony are declared to be the main objective of contemporary U.S. military doctrine. It was proclaimed as far back as 1945 in Truman's message to congress when he asserted that victory in the second world war confronted the American people with the continuous and vitally necessary leadership of the world. This statement was reaffirmed by all presidents in various forms in subsequent years. Imperialism has always striven and will continue to strive to take social revenge, to change the existing relationship of forces and events unfavorable to it, and to press, and in the final analysis, as Reagan declared, also to eliminate socialism as a social system.

All of these reasons and objective factors are capable of stirring up the danger of the emergence of war or military conflicts, which could at any time take a very unexpected turn that closely impinges on the interests of the USSR and other socialist countries. However, there is no fatal inevitability of war under current conditions. The CPSU Program comes to the definite conclusion that it is possible to prevent war and to save humanity from catastrophe.

The fact that a modern nuclear missile war cannot be won also has been acknowledged more than once by U.S. leaders. Then what are the imperialist circles of the U.S. and other NATO countries counting on in following an aggressive policy and course in preparing for war? They are trying by means of the arms race to stimulate their own economy and to undermine the economy of the USSR and other socialist countries, to scrap strategic military parity, to attain decisive military and technical superiority, to bring pressure on other countries and to dictate their will. Plans are being nurtured for achieving the political objectives of war with the employment only of conventional means of destruction.

In its military preparations, the Pentagon has not yet completely abandoned the illusion of the possibility of achieving victory in a nuclear war. Up until now U.S. military doctrine has been based on the delivery of a preemptive nuclear strike. Thus, presidential directive No 59 of 1950 formulated the U.S. objective very

specifically: the destruction of socialism as a socio-political system, first use of nuclear weapons, achievement of superiority over the USSR in a nuclear war and its conclusion on terms favorable to the U.S. The "strategic defense initiative of the U.S." was called upon to serve the attainment of this objective. Announced by the U.S. president on 23 March 1983, it was intended not only to create a large-scale antimissile defense with elements of space basing, ensuring, according to Pentagon calculations, delivery of a first nuclear strike with impunity, but also the placement of strike space weapons in orbit that were capable of destroying targets on Earth. Convinced that they could not achieve decisive superiority by improving strategic offensive forces, the politico-military leadership of the U.S. decided to shift the arms race into space.

Also, it is not accidental that attempts were made recently to prove that after the sides exchanged nuclear strikes a "nuclear winter" need not necessarily follow. Some American "investigators" said in that respect that the employment of air bursts and neutron munitions would reduce the negative effects of nuclear weapons use. In the same way, an effort is being made to show that a nuclear war can be won under certain conditions. Practical preparation for such a war is proceeding in all directions, and military preparations are increasing.

And all of these military preparations are being implemented each time under the cover of deceitful demagogic cries about the "Soviet military threat." Back in 1919, V. I. Lenin talked about those foolish people who believe in the "Red" danger and cry about "Red militarism." "These are," he emphasized, "political frauds who give the impression that they believe this nonsense."

As has already been noted, after the civil war the Soviet republic reduced the Red Army by 10 times, and in the years 1924-1925 it had relatively the smallest army in the world (in the number of servicemen per 1 million population). But they also cried then about "Red" militarism. In the 1930's, Western countries fussed endlessly about the threat on the part of the Soviet Union, and under this pretext they armed and prepared fascist aggression against our country. And in the postwar years, each spiral of the arms race was accompanied and is accompanied in our day by the hysterical howlings about the excessively armed countries of the Warsaw Pact, although it is known that the U.S. and not the Soviet Union is the initiator of the arms race.

If this is so (and it is impossible to refute these obvious and well-known facts), then why are all of these myths about the "Soviet military threat" necessary? John Dulles, one of the inspirers of the "cold war," answered this with great clarity: "In order to compel the country to assume the burden which the support of powerful armed forces requires, it is necessary to create an emotional atmosphere bordering on military hysteria. It is necessary to evoke the fear of danger from without." Consequently, the "secret" consists of the fact that political

justification is necessary to a continuously developing arms race, and therefore the military-industrial magnates require an intensification of an aggressive policy and the continuous application of threats and ventures fraught with the potential for turning into war.

All of this, of course, can in no way be tied to new thinking about questions of war and peace. In contrast to the aggressive policy of the imperialist states, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are conducting a consistently peace-loving policy. Soviet military doctrine believes that no matter how great the threat to peace is under the existing conditions created by the policy of aggressive imperialist circles, it is possible to prevent war. Socialist countries are confirmed enemies of war in any form. It is impossible in the nuclear space age to ensure the security of an individual state or of a group of states by military and technological means alone. Political means and actions take on an ever increasing significance in ensuring security.

A meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member countries in Berlin in May 1987 very sharply posed the question that a historical moment has arrived when it is necessary to reject the concept of "nuclear deterrence," according to which nuclear weapons are a guarantee of a state's security. The socialist countries propose to the NATO states that, on a mutual basis, they reject the use of military force and that they assume the obligation of supporting peaceful relations between them. Hence, the doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states is declared. The proposals of the USSR and other socialist states have been reaffirmed, and they are directed at the complete elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, a reduction in arms, a radical reduction in strategic offensive armed forces and conventional weapons of the USSR and the U.S. with a simultaneous strengthening of the regime of the ABM Treaty, a rejection of placing weapons in space, a ban on chemical weapons and nuclear testing, the disbandment of military blocs, the elimination of foreign bases, and the redeployment of troops from foreign bases to locations within national borders.

A meeting of M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and R. Reagan, president of the U.S., the persistent efforts of the Soviet leadership, and the realistic position of U.S. leaders, have already brought the first positive results, which have great historical significance. The achievement of an agreement on the elimination of medium and lesser range missiles has in a practical way made a beginning in the building of peace without nuclear weapons. Significant progress has been made on the problem of radical reduction of strategic offensive forces under the terms of adherence to the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union is fully resolved under mutual agreement also consistently to put all other proposals on weapons reduction into practice.

However, under conditions when a real military threat posed by the imperialists is not decreasing, the USSR and other Warsaw Pact member states are forced to

strengthen their defense capabilities and increase the combat readiness of the armed forces in order to ensure reliable protection of the gains of socialism.

The new version of the CPSU Program states: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers the defense of the socialist Motherland, the strengthening of the defense of the country and guaranteeing state security as one of the most important functions of the Soviet state." As required by the USSR Constitution and party regulations, every communist, every Soviet person, is obliged to do everything in his power to support the defense capabilities at an appropriate level.

The main content and direction of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states is in complete accord with the objective of the peace-loving policy of the countries of the socialist community and the interests of ensuring their security: not to permit a nuclear war, to make themselves secure and to defend their countries against the encroachments of imperialism, and to provide the people with an opportunity to work under peaceful conditions. All of their measures in the military sphere are permeated exclusively with the interests of resolving this principal defense task. The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states has a purely defensive direction, to the effect that defensive measures and military organization in the allied countries are conducted within the context of military balance and necessary sufficiency and are intended exclusively for retaliatory actions and defense against possible aggression.

It was once again asserted at the aforementioned meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states that they would under no circumstances initiate war—neither nuclear nor conventional—against any state, be it in Europe or any other area of the world, if they themselves do not become the target of an attack. The countries of the socialist community declare that they have no territorial claims on any state in Europe or outside of Europe. They do not treat any state or people as their enemy. The attainment of the lowest level of military confrontation would meet the interests of the Warsaw Pact member states. The maintenance of a military balance at the lowest possible level is a very important condition for ensuring security and peace. Genuine equal security in our century is guaranteed not by high but by very low levels of strategic balance. Continuation of the nuclear arms race can lead to the fact that parity (balance) will stop being a factor in military-political deterrence.

But inasmuch as the level of these limits is constrained by the military preparations of the imperialist states, then the defensive power of the socialist countries must be built taking into account that in relation to the USSR and the U.S. and the WP and NATO it should be equal and identical: their security—mutual, and in an international respect on the whole—universal. "Realizing the scale of the military threat," M. S. Gorbachev points out, "and recognizing our responsibility for the fate of the world, we will not permit a breakdown in the military-strategic balance

between the USSR and the U.S. and between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO. We will also adhere to this policy in the future, for we have firmly learned once and for all what the past has taught us."

The defensive character of our military doctrine predetermines the especially high requirements for the combat readiness of our army and navy. Soldiers of the socialist countries must display high vigilance and always be ready to stop the intrigues of imperialism. This is especially important when one considers that there are also quite a few serious shortcomings in the activities of military cadres in maintaining high military readiness, which the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee severely and justly pointed out in connection with the violation of USSR air space by a foreign aircraft at the end of May of last year. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee once more underscored the principal importance of the task of a decisive increase in the level of combat readiness and discipline in the Armed Forces, efficient command and control of forces, and assurance of their constant ability to stop any encroachment on the sovereignty of the Soviet state.

The strength of our Armed Forces lies in their indissoluble unity with the people. One of the most important lessons of the war is that only through the efforts of the entire nation under the leadership of the party can a reliable defense of the socialist Motherland be assured. Of great significance to the further strengthening of the country's defenses is the restructuring which was laid down by the 27th CPSU Congress and which is being implemented in the country, and the profound socio-economic, spiritual and cultural changes that are taking place in our society. The improvement in ideological-political and military-patriotic education, intellectual and physical development, and an increase in the general education and technical level of young people make it possible to achieve an even more profound understanding by soldiers of their patriotic and military obligation and the personal responsibility of each Soviet citizen for the defense of the socialist Motherland. The development of democracy, glasnost and improvement in the moral atmosphere in society suffuse the ideals of socialism, which must be defended, with a more profound meaning. In addition, all of these changes create favorable conditions for a more successful mastery of military specialties and complicated military equipment and weapons in a short time, which contributes to a further increase in the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

One should consider that the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces are occurring today in a complicated international situation. On the one hand, there is a steady struggle for peace and disarmament, and the idea of preventing war is becoming increasingly more convincing and stronger. On the other hand, the threat of war continues to exist. In such a dynamic and contradictory situation, the organic combination and successful resolution of the two-part task of strengthening peace and the defense capability of the

country takes on some new features and becomes a more complicated matter than was the case up to the Great Patriotic War. Under these conditions, all of the work in preparing young people for service in the Armed Forces and military-patriotic education should be significantly more profound, well-reasoned and convincing.

In this connection, it is intolerable when individual articles published in our press express judgments concerning unilateral disarmament. The necessity for defense of the Motherland and the military profession is put into doubt.

The more complex matter of the struggle for the reduction of arms, on which so much selfless work, persistence and energy has been expended by the leadership of our party headed by M. S. Gorbachev, is depicted by some journalists in an overly simple way, and only as the psychological inertia of a race after each other. The matter amounts to such irresponsible statements that some writers, in essence, call on our soldiers not to deliver a retaliatory strike on an enemy, even if he is the first to start a war against us. But this kind of position has nothing in common with genuine interests in the fight for peace. For this not only does not deter, but it even encourages an aggressor to attack. Frequently these writings come from communists who cannot help but know that resolutions adopted by the 27th Congress, party regulations and the USSR Constitution define tasks and duties for all communists and Soviet citizens in strengthening the defense of the country and performing military duty for the Motherland. They propose that the Soviet Union boldly pursue unilateral disarmament and a reduction in the period of military service. But the most remarkable thing is that, as a rule, (and this is the main essence of their position), they do not make any proposals relative to the reduction of weapons of the NATO countries. In one of the articles in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, a well-known writer has no feeling for us, and he literally gloats over the landing of a West German plane in Moscow.

Some are already raising doubts about our victory in the Great Patriotic War, since, they say, there were too many losses, and we did not win battles the way we should have; they propose that we reject the concept of "just" and "unjust" wars, and that there should be no distinction between the aggressor and his victim.

One automatically thinks: but in 1812 the Russian Army had to retreat and even surrender Moscow. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, which brought freedom to the Balkan nations, there was even more confusion. But all of these wars have remained in the memories of the people in a halo of glory, and no one every tried to raise doubts about the victories of the Russian Army. But here, speaking politely, there is an undertone of hostility to their own Armed Forces, who won such great victories and who did so much for the defense of

the freedom and independence of their Motherland. The question arises in this connection: to what purpose is all of this and where does it come from?

Apparently, all of this is explained by three circumstances. First, and this is the main thing—a majority of the errors result from an underestimation of the complexity of the struggle for peace and the military threat that really exists. And in this sphere a unique kind of "avant-gardists" have appeared who, with good intentions, of course, put out what we all desire as fact. Second, this is simply our ill-wishers. We will never change the minds of such people on anything, but apparently it is also not possible to underestimate the damage that they can cause. Moreover, as became known, some leading imperialist states have developed a whole system of measures for weakening the combat capability of the armies of the socialist countries through the dissemination of pacifist ideas. They are carrying out this work rather aggressively, and some naive people take this bait, helping to play into their hands, not comprehending that in the real international situation the struggle for peace and readiness to defend it with weapons in hands do not contradict but complement each other. Otherwise, this will not be a philosophy of peace but a philosophy of capitulation before an aggressor. Third, an overwhelming majority of the personnel of the army and the navy honorably and selflessly perform their duty to the Motherland. However (and we also must acknowledge this with self-criticism), many negative phenomena that have accumulated in society have also penetrated the Armed Forces. The Soviet people

have gotten accustomed to seeing in our officers a model of honor, high morality, and selflessness, and any deviation from this standard is met by a protest and just condemnation.

Glasnost has also touched the military environment, and facts are becoming known which heretofore were not always public. Along with objective and correct criticism, they are frequently accompanied by narrow-minded gusto. Extensive glasnost (within the limits of keeping state and military secrets) will bring nothing but benefits, and it should not be feared. But, as we believe, the criticism of shortcomings that exist in the army and the navy should be benevolent and promote the strengthening of their combat capability.

An incident like this comes to mind (the papers have already written about something like this). The matter occurred before the war. One young man from near Mogilev, before entering school, wrote his mother a letter, asking for advice: "Mama, should I enroll in a military school?" The woman, who was poorly educated but who grasped the complexities of our life, replied: "Son, of course, go to the military school—it is not for us to hire foreigners to defend our Motherland." And I would like to wish that all Soviet people understood the importance of one's military duty as profoundly as does that White Russian woman made wise by life's experience.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Pravda", "Okt'yabr", 1988

13052

Tank Troops Chief on Problems, Goals
PM1409095388 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in
Russian 11 Sep 88 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with Lieutenant General A. Galkin, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Armor Directorate, by Lieutenant Colonel S. Pashayev: "Tank Troops: Their History and Prospects"; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Pashayev] Comrade Lieutenant General, interest in our history, including military history, is perhaps greater now than it has ever been. So it is no wonder that, on the eve of Tank Troops Day, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers' letters contain quite a few questions on the history of the tank troops. What can you tell us about this, considering the past and looking to the future of this category of troops, which we rightly call the country's armored shield?

[Galkin] Let us think back to the situation which took shape in the country in the late twenties and early thirties. A difficult and anxious time. But the industrialization which had begun was already making it possible to begin creating a defense industry and to develop a whole series of new sectors within it, tank building in particular. The army was reinforced with technically skilled cadres. [passage omitted]

The consequences of the personality cult had the gravest effect on implementing the achievements of the country's military thinking. The authors of new views were soon declared "enemies of the people" and annihilated and their works were banned. Consequently, under the influence of erroneous conclusions drawn from the limited experience of the use of tanks during the Spanish Civil War, the Red Army's Main Military Council chaired by Stalin adopted the 21 November 1939 decision to disband the tank corps.

But of course this ultimately tragic decision was not on the conscience of Stalin alone. K. Voroshilov, people's commissar of defense at that time, was also a stubborn and consistent opponent of the development and improvement of powerful tank forces. It was he who stated at the 17th All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) Congress: "It is necessary... once and for all to end the disastrous 'theories' about replacing horses with machines, about the 'disappearance' of the horse." Until the war itself Voroshilov was firmly convinced that "the Red cavalry is still a victorious and devastating armed force which can resolve tasks on all combat fronts." All these delusions, which were contrary to the times and to elementary logic, had to be rectified afterward at a high cost, as everyone knows....

[Pashayev] The materials of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference formulated the task of trying to increase the country's defense capability primarily in terms of qualitative parameters. In what areas is this party guideline now being implemented with regard to tank troops today?

[Galkin] Let me begin by saying that the military-technical aspect of Soviet military doctrine quite clearly defines the necessary qualitative and quantitative parameters of armament and equipment as well as the level of training and preparation of personnel—they must ensure the reliable defense of the socialist fatherland. This also applies fully, of course, to tank troops.

It should be noted that in recent years work connected with the modernization of old types of armored hardware and the creation of new combat machines has continued unabated in our army just as in the armies of other countries, particularly the Western countries. Soviet designers have worked strenuously to improve their protective armor and collective systems of protection against mass destruction weapons, to increase their roadability, and so forth. Work has been done to ensure the work of crews in different climatic, geographical, and meteorological conditions and during firing from stationary positions and on the move. Nor do we lag behind world tank building in terms of the firepower of armored hardware. It is being increased by the use of modern means of automated target designation and destruction, the use of laser range finders, electronic ballistic computers, and other modern technical resources.

Questions of increasing tank mobility by improving power units and creating our own multifuel diesel engines are being resolved. The priorities here are capacity, economy, and increased range and service life. The high reliability of our combat hardware under all operating conditions, of course, is still the requirement that has traditionally been the guideline for Soviet engineers and designers.

All that I have been talking about is not, of course, a goal in itself. These are enforced measures which, as is well known, divert considerable resources from our economy and from the solution of urgent social problems. But at the moment there is no alternative.

[Pashayev] Yes, the modern tank and, in particular, the tank of the future cannot be compared with the combat vehicles which we had, for example, at the end of the Great Patriotic War. But they are harder to learn to operate, of course. Is it not the case that the level of hardware development is somewhat ahead of the level of training of those who operate it?

[Galkin] A difficult question. The level of technical preparation and, of course, other preparation of the officers, warrant officers, NCO's, and enlisted men who operate combat hardware is a factor which greatly determines its combat readiness and capability. In 10 years equipment may change considerably, whereas the system of training people to operate it to a high standard does not undergo revolutionary change, as is well known. Here, too, of course, we are trying to do things. Specifically in the sphere of introducing into personnel training the new method of instruction using so-called training charts and the creation of modern simulator complexes,

which help to develop and reinforce the necessary skills in tankmen. I think it appropriate to point out here that in terms of design and technical characteristics, the new generations of simulators are essentially comparable to the given types of combat hardware. The paramount task now is to ensure that training and combat units are provided with the full requirements for them as quickly as possible.

Among the priority areas of restructuring I would cite one more factor. Namely, the optimization of our work and service system and the resolute rejection of elements of formalism and bureaucracy. This is serious and difficult work. To all intents and purposes we are only just beginning.

[Pashayev] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, today we usually talk about the enhanced role of the human factor. It is clear that among the specialists of the Main Armored Directorate, officers among the troops, engineering and technical personnel, and workers in industrial enterprises there are many enthusiastic, energetic, and enterprising people....

[Galkin] Generally speaking, the role of the human factor has been considerable at all stages of the building and combat path of the Soviet Armed Forces. The attitude to the human factor and to men in general is a different matter. At this point it has changed most fundamentally, and this cannot fail to be reflected in people's work and their personal contribution to restructuring. Take our directorate, for example. In effect it is the staff of a whole sector in which a large number of problems connected with the development, testing, production, operation, and repair of various types of armored hardware are actually resolved. Much depends on how we work in the new conditions, particularly in the conditions of the economic reform, which fully affects the tank industry, too.

Of course, people's workloads are increasing, as is the degree of responsibility. Yet we, like everybody else, have set about streamlining the management apparatus. As a result, the productivity and efficiency of the work of Main Armored Directorate personnel should increase steadily. People understand this and are ready to do everything they can. But the conditions for that still have to be created. First it is necessary to remove the obstacles and reject what is outdated. It is important to promptly support and help those who raise questions of principle and are ready to resolve them without delay. [passage omitted]

[Pashayev] Comrade Lieutenant General, who trains specialist cadres to operate and service armored hardware among the troops and for the Main Directorate? Is it not the case, as one of our readers suggested, that this is done by poor commanders and chiefs of staff with no future ahead of them, so to speak?

[Galkin] No, of course not. All Main Armored Directorate personnel have higher military or higher military specialist education and adequate experience of service among the troops or military delegations at USSR Ministry of Defense industrial enterprises and repair plants. You cannot say that they are people with no future. Generally speaking, the selection of people in our field is as thorough as it can be. After all, it is not enough for the candidate to be, for example, an intelligent officer, a skilled engineer, or a good organizer. He must be a natural innovator, know how to think in the new way and on a large scale, and be distinguished by high military technical professionalism. As you can understand, the military academy alone is not enough here. So I would not say that we have no problems with cadres. There are problems. The principles of selection, which I spoke about earlier, have not always been observed, unfortunately. That is why those who do not cope with their increased tasks and are indifferent to their work now have to make way for others. But this isn't only true of our sphere....

As to the training of our specialists, they receive their initial military and military engineering training at higher tank command schools and engineering schools where training takes 4 and 5 years, respectively. Having gained military experience the most capable officers enter the command and engineering faculties of the Military Academy of Armored Troops named for Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy.

[Pashayev] Recently there has been quite a lot of press criticism of the Armed Forces. Obviously, not all of that criticism is fair or objective. But one must agree in particular that the problem of inculcating a love of and respect for army service has somehow been neglected and that a considerable part of the blame for this is ours. In this connection does it not seem to you that the state of the exhibition of armored hardware which the Main Armored Directorate possesses and which has essentially become a "limited interest museum" is out of keeping with the times?

[Galkin] I must say that your information on our museum is not quite right. Yes, it is a unique exhibition of armored hardware, mainly tanks. It is the only one in the world with such a large number of combat vehicles of different periods—around 300 examples. They are trying to create something similar now in Britain and the FRG. But it is not only specialists who make use of the exhibition. We see its main purpose primarily in popularizing armored hardware and in acquainting our contemporaries with the creations of design thinking in the world. At the same time we try to instill in those who visit the museum, primarily in young people, a sense of love of and respect for the Soviet tank building school, which is rightly recognized as one of the world's best and about which, to our shame, many people still know very little. [passage omitted]

New 'Kiev' Class Carrier Joins Fleet

18010265a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Jul 88 p 1

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank V. Pasyakin: "The Aircraft Carrier 'Baku'"]

[Text] It seems that it was quite recently that it was announced that the aircraft carrier "Kiev" went out into the ocean. It was the first one. And now the fleet has been augmented with another ship of this class—the aircraft carrier "Baku." Anyone who can compare them cannot but know the number of design differences and technical innovations that are applied here.

But the more advanced technology and weapons also require more advanced training of the crew. In spite of the difficulties of the period of establishment, the "Baku" crew is proceeding confidently toward the earmarked goals. According to the results of last year the cruiser held second place in the division and performed all rocket and artillery firing and combat exercises with high marks.

There is no doubt that a good deal of credit for this goes to the ship commander, a winner of the order "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3rd Degree, Capt 1st Rank V. Lyakin. He is the son of an officer. He completed the higher naval school with distinction. As commander of the mine-torpedo combat unit of the destroyer "Svetlyy," he brought it up from behind to be one of the best on the ship. Then he served as the senior assistant on the destroyer "Speshnyy," and commanded the large missile carrier "Prozorlivyy." As commander of the "Baku" Lyakin was appointed to the position of senior assistant commander of the cruiser "Kiev." Making the ship ready for combat was a difficult and responsible matter. And not simply because it is difficult to master new technical equipment. The crew must be tempered and the first traditions must be established.

11772

Problems in Naval Combat Training

18010265b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Jul 88 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Khaptovich: "Unconventional Conventions"]

[Text] Dear editors! I read in the newspaper on 31 March the article by Capt 1st Rank M. Motsak entitled "Obsolete Paragraph." From my own experience I know what a serious issue is being raised here. But I did not see in the article the whole truth about the situation with respect to combat training in the navy, so Comrade Motsak's apologies for a certain "brevity of my judgments and evaluations" evoked in me a feeling of confusion and that same bitterness: obviously they were left "for the personnel."

The main idea of the article—that the obsolete views and norms, the stagnant (ingrained) forms of combat training,

and the lack of desire to change anything have a negative influence on the combat training of the personnel—unfortunately, was reduced to the notion that attempts somehow to change the position lead to a reduction of evaluations. And this means they have an effect on the personal destinies and the service of the officers. Yes, this is true. But the main thing here is something else; the main thing has to do with the preparation of the ship and the crew for combat with a real, powerful, and well-trained opponent. This is barely mentioned in a single phrase: "...It would be better today in combat training not to have everything go so smoothly but to acquire new experience. The very experience that will bring victory tomorrow." Here one should not be timid but should sound the alarm and shout at the top of one's voice.

You say—this does not need to be done in the newspaper. No, not necessarily. Attempts to change anything with these kinds of reports do not lead to success. After many years of superficial displays and stagnation, in combat training we have resorted to the notorious gross output, to figures, summaries, and indicators. But still we rarely think about how, under what conditions, in battle with which "opponent" these figures and indicators are achieved. As long as they promise well-being—and personal well-being has been provided. But combat with a real opponent? After all, it is possible that there will be none. But if there were, then when, but it is necessary to live today. Therefore Capt 1st Rank Motsak is right when he says that for the most part today the conditions for performing combat exercises are conventional difficulties of a conventional search (I would add a conventional battle with a conventional, deliberately weak enemy.—A. Kh.), with the same "senior officer" on board and staff representatives for insurance.

In recent years we have spoken a lot about the combat readiness of ships and units and, it seems to me, very little about the combat capability. Apparently there are some quite definite reasons for this. In the episode described at the beginning of the article entitled "Obsolete Paragraph," where under Motsak's leadership combat training was conducted for two submarines, any commander can easily recognize the situation in which the ships simply did not discover one another. They could not "apply" the weapons and this means they did not fulfill the task and received unsatisfactory evaluations. In order to avoid these unsatisfactory evaluations (with all the consequences that ensue from this) the commanders are usually given the places and courses in such a way that they will probably meet. Practically everyone knows about this—from the rank and file sailor to the admiral, and it is time to tell the truth.

Paper indicators, paper reports, and the possibility of reporting in figures entail weakening in combat training. And all this, in turn, makes it necessary to make reports on paper. There is a vicious circle and leaving it involves very serious consequences.

Capt 1st Rank Motsak is right when he says that the conventional effort in training generates conventional mastery. This fact has then confirmed repeatedly by practice.

11772

DOSAAF Status in Jewish Autonomous Oblast
*18010267a Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in
Russian 10 Jul 88 p 2*

[Article by B. Korsunskiy, first secretary of the CPSU Obkom of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast]

[Text] In the restructuring we are carrying out an important position is occupied by questions of international, military-patriotic education of the workers, mainly youth. This is especially significant for our oblast which is multinational in composition and geographically lies on the border. And therefore the oblast party organization regards it as one of the leading areas of all ideological work.

The comprehensive plan approved by the bureau of the CPSU Obkom has coordinated the efforts of party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations, DOSAAF committees, the Znaniye Society, public education agencies, military commissariats, and the mass media. Where actions are directed toward one goal—to instill in the boys and girls an ideological conviction, to temper them morally and physically, and to develop in the future fighters the qualities that are necessary to defend the homeland.

The oblast's history, which is rich in revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions, creates extensive possibilities for this. During the years of the civil war thousands of our compatriots courageously defended the Soviet regime in the Far East. On the legendary hill Iyun-Koran a memorial museum has been erected to the heroes of the Volochayev battles. Here the Pioneers pronounce the words of solemn vows, youths are awarded Komsomol cards, and boys going into the army make their vow to serve honorably.

The workers also honor the bright memories of those who fought valiantly in the battles of the Great Patriotic War. Fourteen of our countrymen became Heroes of the Soviet Union and four were full winners of the Order of Glory. Streets and microrayons, production brigades, and Pioneer groups have been named after them. Participants in socialist competition vie for the right to win prizes named for the heroes P. Kagykin and I. Strelnikov. Each enterprise and each institution has put together displays entitled "They Fought for the Homeland" with photographs of veterans from the front and rear—representatives of various nationalities of our country.

The youth are honorably continuing the works of their fathers and grandfathers. Emissaries from the oblast performed their international duty honorably in Afghanistan. Not everyone returned home, but nobody was forgotten. A Pioneer camp located in the outskirts of Birobidzhan was named after one of the heroes, Aleksey Poduruyev. The club called "Tovarishch" composed of Afghanistan veterans and the reserve renders a great deal of assistance to military commissariats and DOSAAF committees in preparing young men for the service.

Any work requires both system and sequence, and especially educational work. Party, Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations of educational institutions proceed from this idea. The young people receive their first lessons in patriotism by participating in the Timurov movement, "search" operations, and military games entitled "Zarnitsa" and "Orlenok." Days of the Young Army Man and reviews of military songs are conducted everywhere.

When they are a little older they master the initial combat training. Lessons in courage and trips to places of combat and labor glory, clubs of international friendship, and universities and schools of the future military serviceman all serve for developing patriotism. And it is very important that along with the youth there have always been enthusiasts of mass defense work, people who are knowledgeable, interested, and involved. Such, for example, as the DOSAAF activists, war veterans G. Pogudin, L. Belaga, A. Tsilman, and N. Ruzanov.

The military leader of the Third Birovidzhan Secondary School, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, Colonel of the Reserves O. Kats enjoys a great deal of respect among the schoolchildren. Under his leadership DOSAAF members conduct active reconnaissance work, and acquire good skills in handling weapons and physical training. In their study of combat equipment they are assisted by officers, sergeants and soldiers of the local garrison.

This means that if they show initiative, search for new forms of work, and combine the forces of all public organizations—success is ensured. Unfortunately, this approach to the matter has not yet become the norm everywhere. For example, for a long time in the oblast center the defense-sports camp "Olimpiya" was considered exemplary. But the time has passed and draftees do not try to come here. Why? Trade union and Komsomol organizations have begun to pay less attention to the camp. The base and work with personnel are not being improved, and traditions have been lost. The city party committee, the DOSAAF gorkom, and the city board of education have been unable to rectify the situation.

More facts. For many years the Smidovichskiy Raykom of the DOSAAF has been raising the question of constructing a firing range in the rayon center. Dozens of letters have been sent to various officials. And in Okiyabrskiy Rayon activists of the Society with the support of the party raykom and rayispolkom are constructing a range through their own efforts. It does not seem that there is any need to explain which approach to the matter is more correct and more realistic.

The oblast party committee sees both the positive and serious shortcomings in the preparation of youth for military service. This has been discussed repeatedly and the obkom bureau. We have analyzed in detail the way this work is conducted in labor and educational collectives and in the place of residence. Special attention has been devoted to strengthening the base necessary for

improving mass defense work and educating, selecting and placing personnel as leaders of committees of the Society and military leaders.

We have already seen certain changes for the better. The soviets of people's deputies, trade union organizations, and the oblast Komsomol have become more active. Party committees have managed to coordinate more efficiently the actions of the local organization of the Znaniye Society, councils of war and labor veterans, and DOSAAF committees. The Center for Educational Work is shifting increasingly in the direction of labor collectives, schools, vocational and technical schools, and secondary specialized educational institutions. The oblast radio and newspapers have increased their contribution to the overall cause.

The results of our common efforts are already in evidence. The command units which receive the recruits from the oblast note: a Komsomol segment has grown up among them, and there are more young men with military specialties and a high level of physical training and sports skills. This is gratifying but it would be wrong to exaggerate what has been achieved: many shortcomings have not yet been eliminated and far from everyone has an opportunity to take advantage of these accomplishments.

Perhaps what harms us most is campaign-like work. For instance, we have a month of mass defense work and sometimes, let me be honest, you would simply be amazed: where to they get all this strength, money, and energy? But as soon as the campaign is over, in many DOSAAF organizations, and not only in them, the long period of inactivity begins. And yet the main thing now is to make this more permanent, purposeful, and energetic.

The ideological influence on the formation of a person's convictions should never weaken. Party committees, every party organization and everyone who is responsible for international and military-patriotic education should see this as his primary task. But this is not always the case in reality.

Formalism is slow in giving up. Sometimes you look at the reports and the guidelines and there is no alarm. There are dozens of technical groups and sports sections. There are clubs and universities for the future military servicemen. Lectures are given and discussions are conducted.

Much is indeed being done in this area. Sports committees have been created and there are sections for radio, automotive, motoring and go-carts. Komsomol and DOSAAF members have formed eight military patriotic clubs. Patronage ties are being strengthened with subdivisions of the Birovidzhan Garrison and the border units.

But still the figures far from always reflect the real situation in the local areas or the main thing—the quality of the measures that are being conducted. Very many of them have inadequate ideological direction, they suffer from poor organization, and they sometimes do not take into account the demands of the youth. Party and Komsomol organizations reconcile themselves to the fact that a considerable proportion of the DOSAAF activists are more concerned about the forms than the content of the work or that certain party collectives belong to the Defense Society only on paper.

Measures are being taken to strengthen the material base. The construction of the oblast house of military-technical education will begin soon. We have an agreement with the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF to open an aviation sports club here. The base is also being improved in the rayon and local organizations of the Society. We are directly local leaders to display more initiative and independence in this work.

But we should like for the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee to be more attentive to our requests. Half measures will not teach the recruits to fire weapons and without visual aids they do not master technical equipment as well....

We are aware of unsolved problems—immediate and long-range. Studying the materials of the 19th All-Union Party Congress and summing up the results of their work, communists of the oblast see clearly that they will have to carry out more difficult and large-scale tasks. To do this it is necessary first of all to resolutely change the attitude of each individual toward the matter entrusted to him. It is precisely here, in my opinion, that one finds the key to successful implementation of the plans for the economic and social development of the oblast and to increased effectiveness and efficiency of all ideological work, including international and military-patriotic education of the workers.

11772

History Journal View of Early Stage of WWII Criticized

18010264 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Jun 88 p 13

[Article by I. A. Belov, participant in the Great Patriotic War: "'Successes' Indeed!"]

[Text] First I will present the text: "Recent 'efforts' of a number of authors, journalists and historians have resulted—contrary to historical authenticity and documents in the archives—in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War turning from 'severe' into 'tragic' and basically being associated with the words 'failure,' 'confusion' and 'bewilderment.'"

"When was that written—in what year?" I asked two of my comrades over the telephone who fought, as I did, from the first month of the war. One replied: "Probably at the end of the sixties." The second said: "During the Brezhnev era."

However, the sentence comes not from the past but from a lead article in the most recent June issue of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL entitled "Remembering the Lessons of History—Strengthening Combat Readiness in Every Possible Way."

As is widely known today, over four million Soviet servicemen were taken prisoner at the beginning of the Patriotic War, the overwhelming majority of whom were killed. Millions of our countrymen perished during this period. We lost the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic region and part of the RSFSR. Approximately 60 million Soviet people

found themselves under a bloody German occupation which resulted in the death of millions of them.

All of this was, and remains, an extremely great tragedy in the history of our Motherland, a tragedy for those now living and for our descendants. It would seem, however, that for our comrades at VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL there is nothing tragic in it. They do not even consider the death of millions of our countrymen and the loss of vast territory—even the fact that the Germans reached Moscow and the Volga—to be failures. Well, what were they then—could they have been successes?

What "historical authenticity and documents in the archives" could refute the facts published in our press and as I have shown above concerning the tragedy of the initial period of the Patriotic War? How much longer will government historians continue to relate fairy tales as to Stalin's infallibility as a military leader and the "strategic enticement of the Germans" to Moscow and the Volga accomplished under his leadership? What "lessons of history" do these people remember, publishing in this era of glasnost and new thinking, whose assertions are truly sacrilegious to the Soviet people?...

Repeated articles have appeared recently in our press, including LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, which show the multi-volume histories of the Great Patriotic and Second World wars as filled with falsification and situational considerations, histories for which dozens of people were decorated, elevated in rank, and presented USSR and even Lenin awards. Now the decision has been made to issue new publications on the history of the wars. Perhaps our "government historians" will be the authors of the new volumes too?

9768

Domestic Reaction to Afghan Vets
18010277 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in
Russian 3 Aug 88 p 11

[Article by G. Apresyan, under the heading "Facts, Problems, Opinions": "Afghan Vets"]

[Text] This neologism appeared in a military-political dictionary of our society in the early 1980's. It is the ninth year soldiers who returned from the Afghan War have been living among us. The soldier-internationalist's adaptation to civilian life is by no means always painless. Much here depends on those next to them.

The city cemetery in Andropov begins with the Path of Honor. Officially, it is not named this; the people themselves some time ago gave this name to the place where frontline soldiers and servicemen who died in peacetime are buried. And the Afghan vets. There are seven of them here who died at 19, 20, 24, 26 years of age...

When their bodies were brought home, as a rule, our mass media said nothing about those who died. It was that kind of war—sort of without casualties. But grief broke loose at home. The funeral parties, invariably headed by local military commissars, delivered zinc caskets to the mothers and fathers. I was told: The military commissars turned gray from such visits.

Were we, estranged from wars for decades, ready to accept the tragedies which were splashed out by the huge number of casualties and injuries? Psychologically, no. That is why we continued to make it appear that Afghanistan was nothing more than a local conflict and that there was no need to arouse passions by describing the battles and mentioning the losses. Meanwhile, the number of tombstones at city and rural cemeteries continues to grow.

Aleksandr Shustov, a worker at the Kirovsk Komsomol Obkom, showed the photographs of graves of Afghan vets he keeps in a special album. There are 74 in the oblast. Here is one plain gray stone, a truncated rectangle, a portrait, and a little lower: "Sukhodoyev Viktor Nikolayevich, 1961-1980. Died heroically in Afghanistan."

"Apparently, the local authorities overlooked it," Shustov explains. "Perhaps, on the contrary, they took a chance... You yourself understand, when you were 18 years old, everything was just beginning. There was trouble later; someone 'above' expressed dissatisfaction. They said it had gone to far... It is more customary to say simply: 'Died in the line of duty...'"

Now we know about the events in Afghanistan, although far from everything. We do not know how they are living now after their war. I asked: How was the situation around them when they returned? They look down—no, they were not welcomed like their grandfathers were in 1945. Recognition of the duty performed is often undermined by the unsettling question: "What was it all for?" Or, in the words of a song made up in Afghanistan: "Tell me, why and for whom did they give their lives? Why did

the platoon attack under machinegun fire?" They need answers to these questions. We all do. To those who have a hard time understanding this, let us suggest: It is not the fault of those who were loyal to their oath and carried out orders that a war unnecessary for our people lasted twice as long as the Patriotic War, inexorably consuming the scheduled call-ups.

Perhaps, just being aware of such a mandatory thought for us, I would take the chance of evaluating and understanding the logic of their individual actions. It is not easy to delve into their sentiments in a conversation, even more so to argue with them.

Just how are they adapting?

Vladimir Zykov was a KamAZ driver in Afghanistan. After serving half a year, he could not sleep normally. Dimedrol did not help; sleep comes only with time. Fate saved him in the war—not a single mine explosion. But after the Army, when a wheel of his peacetime truck ran over something, he broke into a sweat. He could never forget the mines.

Nikolay Kalinin, a senior lieutenant in the reserve, was awarded the medal "For Combat Achievements." After returning from Afghanistan, he served 1 year at a border outpost. The conditions were incomparable. "At first I kept turning my head this way and that. In Afghanistan you were constantly expecting rounds. It was habit, one that is hard to break later."

Sergey Shilyayev is a former paratrooper. He was wounded and also has the "For Combat Achievements" medal. While in Moscow, he passed by a long line at a store. He heard a noise, cursing—someone was trying to get through without getting in line. A fight started. His immediate reaction was to turn around and grab for the nonexistent assault rifle at his waist.

Psychologists study the behavior characteristics of people under extreme conditions and also of those who enter a normal life after the "conditions." Possibly, from the scientific standpoint they will explain Sergey's actions. But from a human standpoint... Sergey believes that he has not yet completely "shaken the tension." And it is probably the same with most of them.

In May of the year before last, an incident was recorded in Kirovo-Chepetsk which was entered in the summary of the oblast UVD [Administration of Internal Affairs]. By tradition, former border guards had gathered together to celebrate their holiday. Afghan vets had joined with them out of solidarity. They drank—purely symbolically, remembering their fallen comrades. After forming up into columns of three and "hacking" the drills, they headed for the Eternal Flame beside the gorkom and gorispolkom building. The first secretary of the gorkom, Lev Ivanovich Knyazkov, contacted the police chief: "Do not tolerate breaches of order!" Several minutes later, patrol cars drove the column of fellows to the walls of the buildings. The following was heard categorically:

"Disperse!"

"On what grounds?" they asked from the formation.

"If you do not disperse, we will use the police dog."

They did not disperse; 69 people stood shoulder to shoulder. The sergeant unfastened the collar, and the German shepherd plunged like lightning into the formation. Biting through Ruslan Urasin's jacket, the dog bit into his stomach.

They retreated. They decided it was better to endure (but, oh, how could they repulse) than to get into a conflict with the authorities. With their own authorities.

In the evening, at the city park the Afghan vets wrote to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. The heads of the combine where most of those involved in the incident work found out about the letter. The shop boss "diplomatically" inferred that if they did not cross off their signatures, they could have difficulties getting an apartment or places in kindergarten. One after another, the signatures began to disappear.

Ruslan Urasin still burns inside from the May incident:

"I cannot forget. Not because my friends were afraid, they were thinking of their families. But because we were misunderstood. No one investigated to see if we were right or not."

(Note: In addition to his regular job, Ruslan teaches boys judo. Four of his students served in Afghanistan, and all returned. Zykin was awarded the Red Star Order last fall.)

Afghan vets are sometimes feared, by passers-by on the streets and by officials in offices. They are afraid of inadequacy and the "volatility" of their actions. An Afghan vet kills a punk, hating his philosophy and way of life. An Afghan vet makes a fuss at the social security agency, demanding to be given a vehicle with manual control, not paying any attention to the Patriotic War veterans listed in this same line. An Afghan vet demands fairness in a production conflict...

Having gone through battles, having stepped over the mortal line, with fundamental views toward life they return to a society untouched by the changes. The people remained the same, as it seemed to them, overly calm, spoiled by the safe existence.

The desire to change something to conform to their understanding of life met with opposition: they tried to "push" the Afghan vets with all their pains a little farther away; they were unfamiliar and uncomfortable for the majority. It was already later that the reserve soldiers officially registered in a separate social group and forced them to be reckoned with.

Incidentally, the veil of secrecy which shrouded the Afghan drama has still not been dispelled today.

Nikolay Prokhorov returned with two Red Star Orders and 3 years later received an Order of Lenin for excellent work at a plant.

What did he do to earn such decorations which few frontline soldiers have? Nowhere was it told in detail about his feats. A fellow worker once said to him: "Look how your chest is swelled. You stick in here for 30 years and they give you nothing, but he is here only a few days and already wearing stocks..."

Envy? A lack of understanding mixed with indifference? But the point is, it is our fault that everything was not explained from the very beginning—who fought and how, who works and how.

It seems to me that even during the years of the Afghan epic, many have not learned to distinguish Afghan vets in the many-faced seething stream of youth trends that have formed in our society. It still occurs: they came and came. Let them be like everyone. Hence the sometimes couldn't-care-less attitude to their combat decorations. You see, there is a reason the lads feel uneasy about wearing orders and medals.

How many angry articles have been written about "false Afghan vets," appearing thanks to the surprising extreme absent-mindedness and trusting nature of those around them. The real soldiers take such facts very painfully.

I observed how they handled one such imposter-soldier at a meeting of the Council of Internationalists of the Moscow Aviation Institute. He initially persisted with impudent self-confidence, but began to confuse the names of Afghan cities and provinces and to dodge—and soon he felt depressed. Someone could not hold back: "His hide!" A fellow in a paratrooper vest, a former scout who had been in the hellish mess, added in a low voice: "I'll rip out your throat for my friends who died."

But in everyday life, the "real" vets are inconspicuous. The blend in with us. They are even apprehensive: Should they buy something in a store using their identity card or stand in line? You see many have artificial limbs under their jeans and scars under their T-shirts, shiver with chills from fever contracted in Afghanistan... But then it is not a matter of inconspicuousness, but indifference!

Of course, not everything is bad. And not everyone is indifferent. Aleksandr Romanovich Verba heads the construction administration in Kirovo-Chepetsk. This year he is moving Afghan vets working in the administration from small-family apartments to full-size ones. He is not a benefactor, and apartments are expensive in the city. Verba simply feels enormous respect for the Afghan vets. Each day between 8:00 and 9:00 in the morning the lads have an opportunity to call him on any matter. He waits for these calls. But the calls are rare. It is uncharacteristic for the Afghan vets to complain, and if they do call, it means that they indeed cannot get something done without his intervention.

I would note that Verba monitors the Afghan vets until they start families and get an apartment and solid working skills.

But here is a different city, a different agency, and a different attitude. Nikolay Sharov, a lathe operator at the Andropov Production Association Poligrafmash, was among the first in Afghanistan.

Nikolay, his wife and two children have occupied a 13.1 square meter room in a dormitory for 8 years. During the winter the year before last, the temperature in the room did not rise above 14 degrees. One corner became so cold that the dampened wallpaper buckled and was covered with dark stains. His year-and-a-half-old daughter is constantly ill. And the family has been in the so-called preferential line for housing for 4 years.

Having lost all hope of getting help at the association, Sharov wrote to the CPSU Central Committee. From there his letter was sent round the departments to the Proletarian Rayispolkom of the city. The reply, signed by Deputy Chairman V. Petelin, began like this: "Citizen N.N. Sharov and his family live in a well-equipped room..."

During the 8 years neither members of the ispolkom nor representatives of the party committee or Komsomol committee have ever been to Sharov's home. Only fellow Afghan vets have visited, but resolving housing problems, unfortunately, does not come under their authority.

All Afghan vets are due benefits. They are provided by our legislation. But often those who are responsible for solving the housing problem have not heard or ever seen anything about benefits.

Just what are the benefits?

The holder of a green or red identity card is assigned to a food store and once a month receives an order. Once in 5 years he can buy furniture without waiting for his turn. There are privileges in obtaining housing. Finally, there is the right to go up to the store counter without waiting in line. That is all... I believed that it was not quite enough, but it turned out I was wrong.

"If I had not been in Afghanistan, nothing would have shined for me in our city of Kirovo-Chepetsk," Yuriy Pervyakov, holder of the "For Valor" medal, told me. "Shine" can mean various things. Yuriy does not expect an apartment anytime soon. True, his housing conditions are incomparably better than those of Kolya Sharov.

After our first meeting, it appeared to me that Pervyakov was not as concerned about his own residence as he was about the facility housing the Kobalt Military Sports Club. My assumptions were confirmed later when I found out that it was Pervyakov who started the club. He and his friends rebuilt the old building themselves, chasing down every brick and bag of cement for it. Later on, they did not persuade anyone to come to their club, the lads just went.

For teenagers, the words "Afghan vets" is a password personifying prestige and courage. The club is a way of passing on life experience and spiritual potential. Boys are drawn toward their elders, passing by the sections, circles and studios which are hated for their monotony. They are interested in and need the process of association, the atmosphere itself of adulthood, which neither school nor customary street company can replace.

Here is what the Komsomol obkom secretary in Kirov said to me: "If it were not for the Afghan vets, all our military patriotism training, particularly in the outlying and remote areas, as before, would be reduced to talk."

Here is another story. Before going into the Army, Sergey Skorniyakov was an excellent skier and jumped from the ski jumps. He came home to Ketelnich, which is near Kirov, without a leg. He was close to despair. His job as a pastry shop manager depressed him. B. Kolomenskiy, a journalist from the oblast "youth" was the first to come to Sergey. Later on, he talked about the meeting at the Komsomol obkom, and Afghan vets went to see Skorniyakov. Army kinship is a great force. Sergey was nominated to the presidium of the first oblast (and the first in the Soviet Union) assembly of reserve soldiers. He was later elected delegate to the 20th Komsomol Congress. In Moscow he was received by the USSR minister of defense, his fellow countryman. They talked for 2 hours.

Today all is well with Skorniyakov. He is busy. This is the most powerful therapy for him. But I think that if it were not for the journalist, if it were not for that trip by the lads... They do not need to share their experience, they need something to do.

The cold wind blows through the deserted cemetery. Maj (Res) Akimov, also an Afghan vet, and I stand at the grave of Gds Sr Lt Vladimir Urvachev. I was at the school where Vladimir studied. It has a small corner in his memory. But I did not meet his mother. Those who visit her are warned that the meeting would be difficult for her. To this day she does not believe that her only son has died and has been waiting 4 years for his return...

I had already encountered this. A father, not believing that they had brought his son from Afghanistan, dug up the grave at night and opened the coffin... Two mothers, whose Afghan-veteran sons lie in the cemetery next to one another, are carrying on a strange rivalry. Each wants the tombstone on her son's grave to be taller than the one next to it... The wounds bleed, the weight of the loss drives people crazy. And this load will weigh heavily for a long time, until they die.

I have met many Afghan vets. Some prefer to say nothing; they have still not gotten over much of the pain. Others calmly and accurately recall details and talk about what they experienced. There are also those among my acquaintances who would be willing to return to their battalions. Despite their barely healed wounds, despite the danger of death. They are the ones who have not

found themselves in civilian life, have not adapted. They are the ones who were outraged by the callousness of the social security and ispolkom officials. They are the ones whose passion for work has remained unclaimed. It is distressing! Today, when the difficult struggle for restructuring is reduced to a struggle between its supporters and foes, the Afghan vets with their keen sense of concern are a force unquestionably striving to renew society.

It seems to me that we should not revamp something in their difficult personalities. They are just what we need: honest, socially critical people able to remain on their feet in areas "under fire." So what if they are not always comfortable for someone, they will always be ours, near and dear.

12567

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

2 Nov 88